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Abstract 
Understanding and measuring a socially relevant and complex phenomenon like the gender 
wage gap requires a thorough understanding of the causal factors arising in the real world. 
This thesis investigates the Marxist and neoclassical theoretical models of the gender wage 
gap and considers the nature of pluralism within different approaches to measuring this 
phenomenon. I analyze the Oaxaca and the Karamessini & Ioakimoglou decomposition 
methods, where various algorithms and regressions are used to decompose the problem of the 
gender wage gap into sub-problems. I further consider how monism and pluralism have been 
coming in and out of fashion in economics over the course of the 20th century and well into 
the 21st century – where pluralism seems to be on the rise and is a contentious topic of 
discussion in mainstream economics. The analysis in this thesis illuminates two kinds of 
pluralism arising with respect to methodological approaches that different theoretical 
traditions use to understand the wage gap. I conclude that both kinds of pluralism, modest 
and empirical pluralism, are necessary for furthering our understanding of this complex 
phenomenon and benefit the insight we gain from the various decomposition analyses of the 
wage gap in the real world.   
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1 
Introduction 
Throughout the 20th century, monism and pluralism have been in and out of fashion in the 
mainstream of the discipline amongst economics scholars, students and professionals alike. 
Topics relating to epistemology of economics, history of economic thought, feminist 
economics and pragmatism are all circulating in the discussions of those who identify with 
the pluralist movement in economics (Garnett, Olson, and Star, 2010). With a growing 
dissatisfaction in the way current mainstream economics prepares young scholars to handle 
real world problems and fails to prevent devastating crises, economic scholars, professionals, 
and students started to pay more attention to the voices and claims coming from those in the 
margins or periphery of the discipline. Problems about neoclassical economics and the 
dominant monism of the mainstream continue to be voiced by those refusing to conform, 
who are advocating for alternative theories and broader approaches to real world problems.  
Students across the globe have also been working hard to advocate for changes in the 
discipline, starting with curriculum. The discontentment with mainstream economics 
concerns a lack of attention to three kinds of pluralism: theoretical, conceptual, and 
disciplinary (PEPS-Economie & Jatteau, 2014). Student movements such as International 
Student Initiative for Pluralist Economics and Rethinking Economics were formed to give a 
platform for students to have a voice. Both of these student movements have grown 
worldwide, bringing students together from around the world who all advocate for changes to 
the economics curriculum.  
Given the discontentment amongst some of the people in the discipline over the monistic 
characteristics of mainstream economics, there has been a growing push toward increasing 
 2 
 
pluralism within and about the economics discipline. However, such a movement leads to an 
important question: What is the nature of pluralism in economics? In this thesis, I will look at 
this question in more detail by exploring the monist-pluralist debate about science and 
economics and investigating whether there is a fruitful kind of pluralism within economics. 
In order to look at pluralism about economics, I will investigate a case study, which 
compares Marxist and neoclassical theories of the gender wage gap. In Chapter 1, I introduce 
the monism and pluralism debates in science and economics, followed by the Marxist and 
neoclassical models of the gender wage gap in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 I discuss the kinds of 
pluralism the case study is consistent with, and conclude that at least two kinds of pluralism 
exist in the case study of the gender wage gap and both are useful to economic inquiry into 
this phenomenon. This project contributes to both philosophical and economic scholarly 
literature on pluralism. It contributes to philosophy by providing a case in which multiple 
kinds of pluralism contribute to researchers’ understanding of an economic phenomenon.  It 
contributes to economics by illuminating how my interpretation of multiple kinds of 
pluralism help to make sense of, direct, and improve investigation into complex economic 
phenomenon.  
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Chapter 1 
Monist – Pluralist Debate about Science and Economics 
This chapter focuses on monism and pluralism about science and economics, while first 
developing an understanding of what theories and models are in mainstream economics. 
Gaining an understanding of the role theories and models have in economics will aid my 
investigation later when I look at theories and models about the gender wage gap in Chapter 
2. The chapter ends with a discussion of monism and pluralism about science and economics, 
respectively.  
1.1 Theories and Models in Economics 
In this section I will focus on theories and model in economics, in order to gain a better 
understanding of what the characteristics of economic theories and models are. When 
considering theories and models in this thesis, what is of interest is the relationship between 
mathematical models and their corresponding economic theories. The main characteristics of 
theories in economics includes:  being reductionist, individualistic, and idealized. 
Furthermore, theories are developed by using methodological individualism, which I take to 
mean methods and explanations focused on individual actors.  
In Chapter 2 I look closely at the theory of labor market discrimination from two 
theoretical frameworks, neoclassical and Marxist.  The neoclassical theory of discrimination 
claims that labor market discrimination exists “if individual workers who have identical 
productive characteristics are treated differently because of the demographic group which 
they belong” (Ehrenberg & Smith, 418). This theory is focused more closely on wage 
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discrimination where two equally productive and skilled workers are paid different wages. 
Here I can isolate for gender to understand how gender impacts wage discrimination. The 
neoclassical theory of discrimination is reflected in mathematical models. In Chapter 2 I look 
at two models, Becker and Oaxaca, both of which utilize the neoclassical theoretical 
tradition.  
On the other hand, the Marxist theory of discrimination claims wage discrimination is 
“unequal pay for work of equal value (unequal remuneration in the same job) and unequal 
pay for work of equal value (low valuation of jobs that women do)” (Karamessini & 
Ioakimoglou, 34). Additionally, the theory that “gender discrimination is incorporated in the 
wage structure through both individual and employer wage-setting practices and collective 
bargaining,” while wage discrimination is “embedded in the whole institutional context 
governing wage formation” (34-35). This theory is different from the neoclassical theory 
because of where wage discrimination seems to be originating. I will look at this theory and 
its corresponding mathematical models and compare it to the neoclassical theory and models 
to understand the nature of pluralism arising when these models are considered together. 
Before I dive into this however, I will first look at the nature of models in economics.    
In terms of modeling in economics, there are two model-based strategies used. Morgan 
and Knuuttila (2012) describe the nature of economic models and their roles in economic 
inquiry, while specifying the different roles models play in macro and microeconomics:  
Core micro-economic theory has been axiomatized and economists use sophisticated 
mathematical methods in modelling economic phenomena. Macroeconomics relies in 
turn more on purpose-built models, often devised for policy advice. (50) 
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Understanding the differences between micro and macroeconomic models is important to my 
discussion here because in the case study microeconomic neoclassical models about the 
gender wage gap are being compared to a macroeconomic Marxist model. Microeconomics 
refers to the part of economics concerned with single factors and individual decisions, 
whereas macroeconomics refers to large scale, general factors. What is important to 
understand about the nature of microeconomic theory is that it is built on axioms or 
rules/principles that are accepted as true. Thus, microeconomic models reflect these truth 
claims. Macroeconomic theories on the other hand are purpose-built, where they are intended 
to explain a particular purpose. Thus, macroeconomic models are intended and designed for 
particular use.  
In order to achieve different aims, economists have adopted two different epistemic 
positions, which are reflected in their choice of theories and models. Looking at the models, 
some are idealized and are “seen to make use of stylized, simplifying, and even distorting 
assumptions as regards the real economies in their modelling activities” (51). On the other 
hand, some models are constructions with “representational status” or they can be considered 
“fictional or artificial entities” (51).  For use in economics, models are often idealized in 
order to isolate and measure causal factors of a particular target phenomenon (52 – 54). In 
Chapter 2 I look closely at neoclassical and Marxist models, which are idealized in order to 
measure and understand the causal factors of the gender wage gap.  
To further understand the explanatory role that theories and models have in economics, I 
look to philosopher Harold Kincaid (2012), who offers an account of what mainstream 
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economic modelling requires for explanatory power. He claims that models have explanatory 
power if they can incorporate the following five criteria: 1) the model offers insight, 2) the 
model unifies (different phenomena can be captured by the same model), 3) the model serves 
as an instrument – we can do things with them, 4) the model is isomorphic to phenomena of 
interest, and 5) the model fits the entire phenomena within it (146). Kincaid suggests that 
“insight” is vague, however if the model gives us “insight” to a particular causal factor then it 
is useful (147). Secondly, for unification to exist, that would require the model show “the 
same causal process is behind different phenomena” (147). Third, for a model to be an 
instrument it needs to be useful for us to describe the real causes of particular phenomena. 
Fourth, being isomorphic to the real world means that the causal factors in the model also 
operate in the real world, thus the model can explain the phenomena as it exists in the real 
world. And finally, the model is useful for explaining if can fit the phenomena, as it’s 
understood in the real world, into the model itself – this goes well with number four. These 
criteria are something that I keep in mind as I investigate the models of the gender wage gap 
more closely, although I don’t set these criteria as necessary for the models to explain the 
phenomenon of the gender wage gap. In Chapter 3 I demonstrate that a group of models used 
together, as one explanatory approach to the phenomenon, are more likely to meet these 
criteria and thus improve the explanation and understanding of the phenomenon.  Before I 
get into the actual assessment and discussion about the models however, I will take a look at 
the nature and approach to inquiry within the discipline by looking at the debate about 
monism and pluralism within science and economics.  
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1.2  Monism and Pluralism within Philosophy of Science  
In this section, I will focus on monism and pluralism as described in philosophy of science 
literature. The main source for this discussion is Scientific Pluralism by Kellert, Longino, and 
Waters (2006) (hereafter Kellert et al.), which discusses a general account of monism and 
pluralism within a variety of scientific disciplines. To start, I will look briefly at monism. 
There are particular tenets held by the scientific monist view, as specified by Kellert et al.:  
1. The ultimate aim of science is to establish a single, complete, and comprehensive 
account of the natural (or the part of the world investigated by the sciences) based on 
a single set of fundamental principles;  
2. The nature of the world is such that it can, at least in principle be completely 
described or explained by such an account;  
3. There exist, at least in principle, methods of inquiry that if correctly pursued will 
yield such an account;  
4. Methods of inquiry are to be accepted on the basis of whether they can yield such an 
account; and  
5. Individual theories and models in science are to be evaluated in large part on the basis 
of whether they provide (or come close to providing) a comprehensive and complete 
account based on fundamental principles.  (x) 
These tenets act as ideals to which the monist research agenda aspires. For now, I won’t 
discuss monism in more detail regarding science generally; however, I will return to monism 
with regard to economics in a later section in this chapter.  
As an alternative to monism about science, pluralism is offered. There are three main 
categories of pluralism within the philosophy of science as described by Kellert et al. 
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including: modest, radical, and empirically based pluralist approaches. I will discuss each of 
these in turn. 
1.2.1 Modest Scientific Pluralism 
Modest pluralism advocates for the possibility that it could be necessary to have more than 
one model or theory to explain a phenomenon given the context of inquiry. Sandra Mitchell 
(2002) and Philip Kitcher (2001) are identified by Kellert et al. as proponents of modest 
pluralism.1  
Sandra Mitchell argues for “an integrative model in understanding pluralism” (2002), as 
an alternative to competitive and compatible pluralism (56). Competitive pluralism is the 
view that multiple theories or explanations for a phenomenon can co-exist for a time, but that 
ideally this plurality will resolve itself into monism.  According to this view the pursuit of 
competing hypothesis can accelerate scientific progress, as well as function to maintain 
“multiple, competing theories and explanations … in order to hedge its bets against empirical 
uncertainty” (56).  The aim of such competitive pluralism is to find the ultimate theory or 
explanation that will eventually empirically win out over the competition (56). As stated by 
Mitchell, “These accounts of competitive pluralism presume that pluralism is temporary and 
strategic, but ultimately eliminable” (56). Compatible pluralism is described as a pluralism 
arising from a difference in the “levels of analysis,” such that “questions at different levels 
require different answers” (57). However, Mitchell does recognize some shortcomings of 
                                                          
1 It is noteworthy to mention that Kellert et al. developed the modest pluralism account after Mitchell and 
Kitcher developed their own accounts / methods. Thus, Mitchell and Kitcher did not self-identify as 
proponents of modest pluralism but rather Kellert et al. identified their positions as aligning well to what they 
call modest pluralism.   
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compatible pluralism as it fails to capture the relationship between different or alternative 
explanations. In order to reconcile both competitive and compatible pluralism, Mitchell 
defends integrative pluralism, where “pluralism with respect to models can and should 
coexist with integration in the generation of explanations” (68). I understand this to mean 
that pluralism is simply using a variety of models together or integrating a variety of models 
into the explanation of the phenomenon.   
Similar to Mitchell, Philip Kitcher (2001) argues that pluralism results in variations in 
theories or explanations of the same phenomena. From this perspective, there can exist 
“different theories about one and the same phenomena,” and further, “all truths in one theory 
of X must be translatable into truths in the other theories of X” (Kellert et al., xii). 
Specifically, Kitcher is claiming that you can have different theoretical models, each 
considered true, to explain the same phenomenon. However, the criterion here is that what is 
considered to be true in one model about the phenomenon must be considered true in the 
alternative model about the phenomenon. For example, model A considered Z to be true 
about phenomenon X, and model B considers Z to be true about phenomenon X, and model 
C etc., while model A, B, and C etc. all offer an explanation of phenomenon X. What I 
consider to be important here is that in order for the models to hold the same truths about a 
phenomenon, they must be developed within the same theoretical tradition. I look closer at 
this in Chapter 3, where I see this type of pluralism arising when I look at different models in 
the neoclassical tradition.  
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Although I’ve expressed the usefulness of pluralism through Mitchell and Kitcher’s 
accounts, Kellert et al. raise concerns about this approach to pluralism as it “sometimes leads 
philosophers to three errors” (xii):  
1. To minimize or overlook important differences among scientific approaches.  
2. To dismiss from consideration legitimate scientific approaches that seem to lie 
outside the mainstream. 
3. To exaggerate the explanatory importance of scientific approaches that are in the 
mainstream. (xii) 
 Modest pluralism can lead to problems in one or all of these three areas. This concern 
motivates a stronger pluralist stance. I will continue to explore the consequences of this 
pluralism in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
1.2.2 Radical Scientific Pluralism 
The second kind of pluralism about science is the radical pluralist interpretation, a much 
more extreme approach to pluralism within scientific inquiry, as made apparent by its name. 
Kellert et al. do not discuss this perspective in as much detail which is probably due to it 
having fewer proponents within the philosophy of science. This form of pluralism falls 
largely into the realist domain of scientific inquiry, where “there are an indefinite number of 
ways of individuating and classifying the objects in the world, each of which is responsive to 
different interests, and none of which is more correct than the others” (xiii). This view’s main 
proponent is philosopher John Dupré (1993). Dupré has coined his view as “promiscuous 
realism,” however according to Kellert et al. this view is “hard to distinguish from radical 
relativism” (xiii).  This view could be problematic because it removes any and all constraints 
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on the variety of acceptable explanations or theories of phenomena. Further, the radical 
pluralist interpretation is the most extreme view of pluralism that could be adopted within 
philosophy of science, so say Kellert et al.   
1.2.3 Empirically Based Scientific Pluralist Stance 
The final pluralist interpretation to be discussed is the empirically based pluralist stance. This 
form of pluralism is empirically motivated and argues, “The nature of the world is such that 
its parts can be completely described or explained by a comprehensive account grounded on 
a consistent set of fundamental principles” (Kellert et al., xiii). Simply put, when we go out 
into the world and try to explain the phenomena we aim to understand, we require a plurality 
of explanations to do so. Kellert et al. claim that empirical investigation is required to know 
which accounts of phenomena require pluralist approaches. This means that we must 
investigate or have some level of comprehension of the phenomena in the real world to fully 
acknowledge that empirical pluralism is the appropriate approach to inquiry of those 
phenomena. If empirical pluralism is the approach taken to understand a particular 
phenomenon, there are advantages to this pluralist stance including: providing a means of 
avoiding conflicts hindering progress; emphasizing the partiality of scientific knowledge; and 
being clear that “scientific inquiry typically represents some aspects of the world well at the 
cost of obscuring, or perhaps even distorting, other aspects” (xiv). What is essential to my 
investigation into the wage gap is the advantage of emphasizing the partiality of scientific 
knowledge that the empirical pluralist approach provides. In Chapter 3 I will look closely at 
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this advantage and the consequences of empirical pluralism with respect to the gender wage 
gap.  
The empirical pluralist stance actually goes further to reject monism and fundamentalism 
with respect to representation, 
All representations are partial in that any representation must select a limited number 
of aspects of a phenomenon (else it would not represent, but duplicate). This selective 
and partial character of representation means that alternative representations of a 
phenomenon can be equally correct … The plurality of representations and 
approaches in science is sustained by the complexity of nature, the employment of 
highly abstract representational models, and the diversity of investigative, 
representational, and technological goals (xv). 
  
This approach respects the complexity of the phenomenon and employs many models to 
represent multiple aspects of the phenomenon, without the expectation that one model does 
so in an all-encompassing way, as monism would have it.   
Kellert et al. discuss a number of ways in which an area of inquiry can be characterized 
through an empirical pluralist approach. The characteristics of empirical pluralism include its 
ability to attend to the following considerations:  (a) the complexity of the phenomena – 
whether associated with crossing levels of organization or multiple factors within the same 
level of organization; (b) the variety of explanatory interests; (c) the openness of constraints 
– whether from above or below; and (d) the limitations of particular explanatory strategies 
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vis-à-vis phenomena (xiii –xv).2 This kind of pluralism is able to accommodate ontological 
complexity of the phenomena in question; further asserting the idea that monism fails to 
account for such complexities at some level. 
The next section will proved an introduction to the monism-pluralism debate in 
economics, while presenting a detailed description of the main school of thought and the 
current environment of mainstream economics.  
1.3  Monism – Pluralism Debate within Economics Literature  
The monism – pluralism debate has been an ongoing topic in economics through the 20th 
century. Current mainstream economics supports neoclassical economics as the dominant 
theoretical approach, which itself exemplifies monism. However, this has not always been 
the case in economics. Pluralism has also been dominant in the mainstream at times in recent 
history. Economist Esther-Mirjam Sent (2006) describes the changes throughout the history 
of the discipline and how monism and pluralism have come in and out of fashion over time. 
Sent portrays how neoclassical economics, a theoretical tradition founded in methodological 
individualism, preference maximizing, market equilibrium and based on supply and demand, 
has become the dominant school of thought within the economics discipline as of late. Sent 
criticizes the current discourse in mainstream economics as being consistent with monism, as 
I have discussed it in the previous section. As the discipline of economics narrowed its 
methodologies and boundaries of accepted approaches, monism surfaced alongside the rise of 
neoclassical economics as the most highly accepted method to economic inquiry. This shift 
                                                          
2 I have listed the ways myself, whereas Kellert et al. discuss these ways extensively throughout the specified 
pages.  
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towards monism can be interpreted as a dominant trend towards monism within the 
discipline.  
Monism in economics is recognized by its aim to secure a single theory within 
economics, along with increased use of formalized mathematics and statistical tools. 
Heterodox economist Frederic Lee (2010) notes that monism necessitates that one particular 
approach be considered superior to others and all other approaches should be reduced to that 
one particular approach (22). Furthermore, Lee describes the monism movement as being 
characterized by the rise of the neoclassical school of thought and reduction of alternative 
methods and a reduction of the available tools, models, and theories to those that support the 
beliefs and value systems embedded in the neoclassical tradition (22). The narrowing of the 
discipline describes the change in the discipline from being consistent with pluralism to 
becoming increasingly consistent with monism. Specifically, at one point many schools of 
thought were considered dominant in the mainstream such as neoclassical, Marxist, and 
institutional, whereas now the discipline is dominated by the neoclassical school of thought 
and relatively little research is being done in other schools of thought.  Furthermore, the 
continual formalism of neoclassical economics caused other theories and schools of thought, 
such as Marxist or institutional economics, which are alternative theoretical traditions, to be 
pushed out of the mainstream discourse, further contributing to a narrowing the discourse and 
research goals in economics (Sent, 82). In the next section, I will go into detail about the 
neoclassical school of thought to aid in our understanding of mainstream.   
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1.3.1 Neoclassical Economics 
To understand a little more about the dominant discourse within economics today, I would 
like to go into detail about the neoclassical school of thought. Generally, neoclassical 
economics focuses on individuals, market equilibrium, and the use of mathematical modeling 
and methods applied to economic questions. Theoretical models in neoclassical economics 
are largely based on methodological individuals, preference maximization, and market 
equilibrium. Methodological individualism here means that methods and explanations are 
focused on individual actors. Such individual actors are preference maximizing, meaning that 
given their preferences they will always choose the option that maximizes their utility or 
whichever preference they prefer the most. In order to maximize preferences, neoclassical 
models “assume the independence and autonomy of each person’s utility function” (Saunders 
& Darity, 105). Finally, the markets are assumed to adjust until equilibrium state is achieved, 
this means, for example, and that the price for good X will adjust until the supply of good X 
equals the demand for good X.   
Some critics of the neoclassical school of thought argue that the focus on individual 
interactions within neoclassical economics, preclude it from investigating social issues 
beyond those that can be aggregated from the sum of individuals (Sent, 84). Such criticism 
highlights some of the important traits within the neoclassical school of thought that underlie 
the theories and models considered to be true about economic phenomena. It is possible for 
critics to consider the characteristics mentioned previously as catalysts to the monist 
theoretical and methodological approach to economic inquiry within mainstream economics 
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today, according to monist critics (Garnett, Olson, and Star (2010); Sent (2006); England 
(2003); to name a few presented here).   
A common theoretical tool that is used in neoclassical economics and is based on 
methodological individualism is Pareto-efficiency (or Pareto-optimality). Pareto-optimality 
occurs when individuals voluntarily exchange goods or services to achieve being better off. 
When the two individuals reach a point where any further exchanges would result in one 
party losing utility (or being worse off), the distribution is Pareto-optimal (England, 40-41). 
For example, “redistribution requiring some affluent persons to lose utility for the sake of a 
gain by the poor cannot be Pareto-superior by definition” (England, 41). In laymen’s terms, if 
you were an affluent and altruistic individual and decided to give money to someone less 
affluent than you, i.e. you are exchanging at a cost to you with no monetary benefit (no utility 
increase or personal gain on your part), this means you forego the utility you could gain in an 
alternative exchange. Thus, this exchange is not considered to achieve a Pareto-optimal state 
because a different exchange could have resulted in increased utility for you. This is one 
example of how the tools utilized by neoclassical demand theories in microeconomics are 
focused on self-interested individuals, not concerned with the altruistic social relations or 
connections between individuals. From the Pareto criterion perspective, “the social is not 
different from the individual” (Sent, 85). Generally, the stress on individualism as presented 
by mainstream neoclassical microeconomic theories can be understood as continuing to drive 
monism within the discipline. Now with a more clear understanding now of the neoclassical 
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school of thought, I would like to talk next about some other characteristics of the discourse 
in mainstream economics.  
1.4 Heterodoxy and Anti-pluralist Movement 
As the neoclassical dominance in the mainstream continued to drive the emergence of 
monism, an anti-pluralist movement also emerged (Lee 2010). This anti-pluralist movement 
established unequal engagement by scholars in economics, where most were studying 
neoclassical economics and few were engaging in heterodox economics, which is simply the 
study of economics outside of the mainstream or beyond neoclassical economics.   This 
asymmetry can be seen in the methods, tools, theories, and research programs that scholars 
engage in, which are dominated by neoclassical economics more than any other school of 
thought. Economist David Colander (2010) criticizes this asymmetry and claims it results in 
significant limitations of the knowledge being produced within economics, including the 
methods and scope of economic inquiry (37). Moreover, Colander comments on how 
mainstream economics is highly restrictive in the ideas and voices that are part of the 
conversation, “To enter the mainstream conversation, models and econometrics have to be 
blended in just the right way to convince the mainstream profession that the author has 
something to add” (41). This is an important aspect of the mainstream discourse because in 
order to enter the conversation and have a voice, one must adopt the methods and tools used 
in the mainstream discourse and speak the language of mainstream, neoclassical economists, 
as argued by Colander. These limited conversations and voices contribute to the monistic and 
asymmetric characteristics of mainstream economics.  
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Alongside the movement for monism of theories and methods, there have been other 
schools of thought that have emerged in the mainstream in more recent years, leading to a 
heterodox discourse in economics. Heterodox economists aim to work with alternatives to 
neoclassical economics, while maintaining a voice in the mainstream debates (Colander, 37). 
Heterodoxy in the mainstream might lead one to think that the mainstream is already 
pluralistic; however this interpretation would be a mistake because though the mainstream is 
heterodox, it is still dominated by neoclassical theories, methods, and knowledge production. 
This dominance creates boundaries within the discipline resulting in the neoclassical school 
of thought governing the “preconceptions, approved methods, priorities – all the components 
of an independent research program – that taken together, structure the way particular 
economists approach their subject of inquiry,” according to economists William Waller 
(2010, 57). The boundaries could also actually inhibit practitioners to view work that is 
produced outside of their disciplinary boundary, which could be the boundary between 
neoclassical and non-neoclassical economics. In response to these boundaries, anti-pluralism, 
and monism, which permeates mainstream economics, critics, including some heterodox 
economists, call for pluralism in economic theories and methods (36). This pluralism 
however, goes beyond generally adopting heterodox economics in the mainstream, it 
addresses the boundaries and rules that govern the discipline. The next section will provide 
an overview of the pluralism debate about economics and in Chapter 3 I will focus on the 
different kinds of pluralism about economics in more detail.    
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1.5 Pluralism about Economics 
As mentioned in the last section, both monism and pluralism have come in and out of fashion 
in the economics discipline (Garnett, Olson, and Star 2010). In this section I will now switch 
the focus from monism to pluralism within economics. Garnett, Olson, and Star (2010) 
describe the more recent (20th Century) emergences of pluralism as a first-wave of pluralism 
and a second-wave of pluralism.  
The first-wave of pluralism existed within the discipline during the 1920s and 1930s 
(Garnett, Olson, and Star, 1). During this time, the kind of pluralist environment within the 
discipline allowed economists to “hold a number of different economic beliefs and to do 
economics in many different ways without being out of place or necessarily forfeiting the 
respect of one’s peers” (1). This means that economists could theorize and model a particular 
phenomenon through a variety of theoretical traditions, while not losing respect from peers or 
lacking in critical engagement with the discipline. However, this pluralist environment did 
not persist after World War II. The postwar environment within the discipline was 
characterized by an ascendant scientific monism, spearheaded by postwar U.S. economics 
(1). Regardless, there were dissenters within the discipline pushing against monism. 
According to Garnett, Olson, and Star such dissenters were,  
[…] monist in their pursuit of stand-alone alternatives to mainstream theory. Yet 
they were also pluralist in one important sense. Against the grain of modernist unity-
of-science movement, they sought to make truth and method contestable in 
economic inquiry. (2)     
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It appears to be the case that the dissent from monism aims to develop alternatives to 
neoclassical theories and models, while valuing critical debate amongst these many theories 
and models, as presented by Garnett, Olson, and Star. 
Following this, a second-wave of pluralism emerged in the 1990s. These pluralists were 
pushing against the “notion of science as empire building or pragmatic one-upmanship” 
which existed among monists (2). This second-wave is largely motivated by the idea that 
there is no possibility for any particular theoretical tradition to “possess final or total 
solutions” (4). Garnett, Olson, and Star mention the rising tension between the monist and 
pluralist ideals, which motivate scientific progress in the discipline. Within this tension there 
are many questions that arise about the current discourse in the mainstream:  
[…] Are mainstream economists becoming more pluralist? Are heterodox economists 
as pluralistic as they claim to be? […] Should non-mainstream economists seek to 
produce ‘a single correct alternative to neoclassical economics’ or should they pursue 
pluralist objectives? Is scientific progress enhanced or retarded when individual 
scholars abide by pluralist norms? (4)  
 
These questions all seem relevant and important to the discipline of economics and 
methodological approach inquirers adopt.  
There are many ways that philosophy of science and economics can contribute to the 
debate about pluralism in economics. Given the general understanding of theories and 
models in mainstream economics and the monism-pluralism debate about science and 
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economics, we can now look to the main question governing our investigation in this thesis: 
What is the nature of pluralism in economics?  
In order to address this question I will focus closely on one particular economic case 
study: the gender wage gap. In the next chapter I will introduce the mainstream theory that 
dominates inquiry of the gender wage gap, labor market discrimination. I will then present 
two neoclassical models for understanding and measuring the gender wage gap, which are 
associated with the neoclassical theoretical tradition of measuring labor market 
discrimination.  Next I introduce another theoretical model, which aims to understand and 
measure the gender wage gap according to the Marxist theoretical tradition about labor 
market discrimination. Finally, I discuss and analyze the empirical results from the 
neoclassical and the Marxist models.  
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Chapter 2 
Case Study: The Gender Wage Gap  
This chapter introduces and discusses the main theory used in mainstream economics to 
understand the gender wage gap: labor market discrimination. After a brief conceptualization 
of this theory, I will present three models used to further understand and measure the gender 
wage gap. The first two models are neoclassical and the third model is feminist and Marxist.  
2.1 Labor Market Discrimination  
When considering the gender wage gap, the dominant discourse used to describe and predict 
its behavior is that of labor market discrimination. The gender wage gap has been largely 
theorized as a result of discrimination within the labor market (Cain, 1986). Within the 
economics literature there are three schools of thought regarding theories of discrimination, 
including neoclassical, Marxist and institutional. Theories of labor market discrimination are 
further specified as either demand theories or supply theories. In this chapter I focus on 
neoclassical and Marxist, demand-side theories.    
In his survey of labor market discrimination theories and models, Glen Cain (1986) 
presents conceptual definitions of discrimination as used in economics. According to Cain, 
discrimination is both a practical and a theoretical problem (694 -695). On the practical side 
discrimination is:  
[T]he wide disparity in income, earnings, and wage rates among a variety of 
demographic groups, classified by sex, race, ethnicity, and other characteristics. The 
disparities are systematic, persistent, and considered by most observers to be 
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inequitable, although the definitions and sources of the inequities are often 
controversial. (694)  
The practical problem of discrimination is often understood through observation and the 
quantification of discrimination in the economy. This side of discrimination is often what the 
public or layperson is most concerned about (694).  
The theoretical problem with discrimination is motivated by the question, “Under what 
conditions will essentially identical goods have different prices in competitive markets?” 
(695). When considering this question with respect to economic discrimination, Cain 
suggests, “Economic discrimination refers to a group rather than to an individual, and it is of 
greater concern as it persists over time” (695).  Specifically, for our discussion here, the 
individual workers are men and women and our unit for measuring discrimination is wage 
rates and earnings (696). Now I will look more closely at the neoclassical and Marxist 
models, respectively, which attempt to better understand and measure the gender wage gap 
and its sources.  
2.2 Neoclassical Approach to Labor Market Discrimination 
Within the neoclassical paradigm, labor market discrimination “is said to currently exist if 
individual workers who have identical productive characteristics are treated differently 
because of the demographic groups which they belong” (Ehrenberg & Smith, 418). There are 
typically two forms of discrimination, wage and occupational. Wage discrimination describes 
situations in which women have the same experience and are in the same occupation but are 
paid a lower wage than men. Occupational discrimination describes situations in which 
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women with the same education and productive capacities are forced into lower-paying jobs 
than men.  In order to understand how labor market discrimination can create or sustain the 
gender wage gap, the focus in economics is largely on measuring and modelling wage 
discrimination. Ehrenberg & Smith (1997) suggest “wage discrimination could be identified 
and measured in the following four-step process” (422):  
1. We would collect data, for men and women separately, on all human capital and other 
characteristics that are theoretically relevant to the determination of earnings […] 
2. We would then estimate (statistically) how each of these characteristics contributes to 
the earning of women. That is, we would use statistical techniques to estimate 
“payoffs” to women associated with each characteristic.  
3. […] we would next estimate how much women would earn if their productive 
characteristics were exactly the same as those of men. This would be done by 
applying payoffs women receive for each productive characteristic to the average 
level of those characteristics possessed by men.  
4. Finally, we would calculate the hypothetical average earnings level calculated for 
women (step 3) with the actual average earnings of men. This latter comparison 
would yield an estimate of the different prices for productive characteristics paid to 
men and women. (422)  
Although this process provides an understanding of how to go about measuring the gender 
wage gap there are still some problems with it, as pointed out by Ehrenberg & Smith, having 
to do with productive characteristics. First, there is always a possibility that some productive 
characteristics cannot be measured and second, that such characteristics won’t be included in 
data sets used in modeling. As part of identifying and measuring wage discrimination, there 
are both competitive and noncompetitive market models. However, before looking into detail 
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at the models, I will first highlight some of the fundamental assumptions held within the 
models.   
There are many assumptions that underlie the neoclassical school of thought that are 
important aspects of the theory that develop into characteristics of the models. I have pooled 
together some of the many assumptions that arise in the literature.3 Some assumptions that 
are specific when considering workers include: 
1. Minority and majority [men and women, respectively] groups of workers are equally 
productive (or have equal productive capacity) and have equal tastes for work. (Cain, 
698) 
2. Discrimination against females can be said to exist whenever the relative wage of 
males exceeds the relative wage that would have prevailed if males and females were 
paid according to the same criteria. (Oaxaca, 694)  
3. Discriminatory tastes will be reflected in the wage differences. (Arrow, 5) 
Furthermore, there exist assumptions with respect to the market: 
4. Given the tastes, the markets work smoothly. (Arrow, 5) 
5. General equilibrium requires full employment. (Arrow, 5) 
6. Wages will adjust to clear the market. (Arrow, 5) 
7. Competition tends to reduce the degree of discrimination in the market […] Only the 
least discriminatory firms survive. (Arrow, 9) 
                                                          
3 These assumptions exist throughout the literature; I have specifically pulled them out and listed them in 
these categories. The references are to where each assumption itself was pulled from.  
 26 
 
These assumptions contribute generally to labor market discrimination models and 
hypotheses within the neoclassical paradigm. Different models will add, isolate, and use 
particular assumptions that reflect the goals and aims of the models themselves. Regardless 
of which model is used, neoclassical models and theories generally aim to predict, describe, 
and enhance our understanding of whether discrimination exists in the market and what 
effects it has on demand of labor force (Cain (1986); Ehrenberg & Smith (1997); Arrow 
(1971)). Precision is an important epistemic virtue of neoclassical models. With this general 
understanding of the neoclassical theory and modelling approach to the gender wage gap, I 
will look at two models that are both within the neoclassical theoretical tradition. First I look 
at Gary Becker’s model of discrimination and focus on his concept of employer 
discrimination. This is followed by Ronald Oaxaca’s decomposition model of the wage gap, 
which is a further application of Becker’s model of discrimination.  
2.2.1 Gary Becker Model  
The first model I will go into detail about is Gary Becker’s 1957 model for measuring 
discrimination. This model uses the theory of labor market discrimination to develop 
mathematical tools to measure and determine the existence of discrimination and resulting in 
a wage gap. Becker’s model measure wage discrimination through statistical regression 
analysis. In discussing Becker’s model I refer to two main sources: Joyce Jacobson (1994) 
and Ronald Ehrenberg & Robert Smith (1997). Jacobson focuses attention to Becker’s model 
with respect to gender and Ehrenberg & Smith focus on Becker’s model with respect to the 
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labor market more generally. Together they provide a general understanding and conception 
of Becker that is well suited to the context of this thesis.  
In consideration of the form of methodology used in mainstream economics more 
generally, Jacobson (1994) points out how frequently Becker’s theoretical model is used:  
By far the most widely used method by economists for attempting to measure 
discrimination, either nationwide or in a more limited sphere, is statistical analysis 
of wage patterns […] Researchers attempting to measure the amount of the wage 
differential attributable to demand-side discrimination try to control for supply-side 
factors through use of regression analysis. The unexplained amount of wage 
differential is then attributed to discrimination. (314) 
Jacobson explains Becker’s methodology and models for measuring wage discrimination4, 
starting with the “regression of wage W on personal characteristics” (315):  
 (1)     𝑊 =  ∑  𝛽𝛽𝑛  
where X is a set of n characteristics and β is the corresponding set of n coefficients 
for a set of persons. Regressions have the characteristic that evaluating them at the 
mean for all independent variables yields the mean wage for the group (315).  
Isolating now, specifically, for men and women’s mean wages, we can use the following 
equations: 
(2)    𝑊�𝑚 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑛 𝛽�𝑚 
(3)    𝑊�𝑓 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑓𝑛 𝛽�𝑓 
                                                          
4 The following equations ( (1) – (11) ) and descriptive text about the equations is taken directly from 
Jacobsen, 1994, pages 315 – 317.  
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The next step is to measure the gender wage gap, G: 
 
(4)    𝐺 =  𝑊�𝑚 −  𝑊�𝑓 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑛 𝛽�𝑚 −  ∑ 𝛽𝑓𝑛 𝛽�𝑓 
 
And the unadjusted wage ratio, U, is 
 
(5)    𝑈 =  𝑊�𝑓
𝑊�𝑚
=  ∑ 𝛽𝑓𝑛 𝑋�𝑓
∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑛 𝑋�𝑚
 
 
We can normalize that gap relative to the male wage so that it will range from 0 to 
1:  
(6)    𝑔 =  𝐺
𝑊�𝑚
= 1 − 𝑈 
An adjusted wage ratio can be calculated in one of two ways, using either the male 
mean characteristics (A) or the female mean characteristics (A’) 
 
(7)    𝐴 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑓𝑛 𝑋�𝑚
∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑛 𝑋�𝑚
 
(8)    𝐴′ =  ∑ 𝛽𝑓𝑛 𝑋�𝑓
∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑛 𝑋�𝑓
 
 
Then the unexplained proportion of the gap can be defined in one of several ways, 
either using A, as in the equations for d below; using A’, as in the equation for d’ 
below, or using a different numerator than for d, as in the equation for d* below: 
 
(9)    𝑑 =  1−𝐴
1−𝑈
=  ∑ (𝛽𝑚− 𝛽𝑓)𝑛 𝑋�𝑚
𝐺
 
(10)   𝑑′ =  1−𝐴′
1−𝑈
 
(11)     𝑑 ∗ =  ∑ (𝛽𝑚− 𝛽𝑓)𝑛 𝑋�𝑓
𝐺
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Inasmuch as we cannot tell whether A or A’ will be larger, we cannot predict 
whether d or d’ will be larger. However, if 𝛽�𝑚 >  𝛽�𝑓 and 𝛽𝑚 >  𝛽𝑓 for all n 
characteristics, then d > d*.  
 
Jacobson notes a different commonly used measure:  
The discrimination coefficient D:  
𝐷 =  𝑊𝑚𝑊𝑓 − (𝑊𝑚𝑊𝑓 )°(𝑊𝑚𝑊𝑓 )°  
where (𝑊𝑚
𝑊𝑓
)° is the wage ratio that would be observed in the absence of 
discrimination and 𝑊𝑚
𝑊𝑓
 is the actual wage ratio. The larger D is, the greater the 
amount of discrimination (342).  
 
Overall, what this model is telling us is that discrimination is the result of dividing the 
adjusted wage for men or women, a mean wage measuring individual characteristics, by the 
unadjusted wage. Thus, the resulting value reveals the proportion of the wage gap that is the 
result of discrimination. For example, if women’s adjusted wage earns a decreasing 
proportion of the unadjusted wage we would see the percentage explained by discrimination 
increasing (i.e. if A’ is decreasing, then d’ would be increasing). With this, we now have a 
general measure for discrimination with respect to men and women’s wages.  
With this general measure of the gender wage gap established, I can now focus on the 
sources of discrimination discussed in the literature concerning Becker’s model of 
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discrimination. Referencing again to Ehrenberg & Smith and Jacobson, I will look at the 
three different sources of discrimination: personal prejudice, statistical prejudgment, and 
noncompetitive markets.5 The first model to be discussed is that of employer discrimination 
which falls into the categories of personal prejudice or tastes for discrimination models.  
Within employer discrimination models, the wage of workers is measured with respect 
to their marginal revenue productivity, MRP and the devaluation of their productivity, d. 
Marginal revenue product is the change in revenue (or gain) with the addition of one extra 
unit, keeping all other variables and factors the same. The devaluation of productivity is the 
loss associated with the extra unit. The unit of measure here is each worker themselves and 
the work they do. The following two equations show the measure of wages for men and 
women, respectively (433): 
(1) MRP = WM 
(2) MRP – d = WF 
Or MRP = WF – d 
Therefore: WM  = WF + d or  WF  = WM  - d 
In equation (1) we see that the wage men earn equals the gain or revenue earned for their unit 
of productivity. Whereas, the wage women earn equal the revenue earned for their unit of 
productivity after it is devalued (MRP – d). Ehrenberg & Smith point out important 
implications of this measure. First, non-discriminatory employers hire men until the marginal 
                                                          
5 Ehrenberg & Smith labelled the three general sources of labor market discrimination in their text on pages 
432-448. Jacobson discusses “models involving tastes for discrimination” and “models of discrimination that 
do not involve prejudice” on pages 323 – 334. Both authors’ accounts of models will be discussed together as 
applicable.  
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revenue productivity equals the wage of men, thus maximizing their profits (see equation (1) 
above) and will do the same for women. Therefore for non-discriminatory firms:  
MRP = WM = WF 
Discriminatory employers on the other hand, “give up profits in order to indulge their 
prejudices” because they will pay higher wages to alternative employers instead of hire 
women or minorities who they hold distaste for (see equation (2) above) (434).  
What is most important to note however, is that with employer discrimination, 
“discriminators seem to be maximizing utility (satisfying their prejudicial preferences) 
instead of profits” (436). This is important as firms, generally in competitive markets, 
maximize their profits, thus any firm not doing so should be out-competed by the firms 
which do. This suggests that non-discriminatory firms should be out-competing 
discriminatory firms in the long run. However, the literature shows that we still see the 
gender wage gap as a result of labor market discrimination in the long run (436). Thus, 
market forces are not working in competitive markets as they are assumed to. Specifically, 
Ehrenberg & Smith suggest, “[…] employer discrimination is most likely to persist when 
owners or managers have the ability and the incentive to pursue a goal other than profit 
maximization” (436). Jacobson aligns with this claim by suggesting that in response to the 
behavior of non-discriminatory firms driving out discriminatory ones in competitive markets, 
it is likely that less competitive markets will host more discriminatory firms, such as 
monopoly markets. I will go into more detail on monopoly markets later in this section.  
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In addition to employer discrimination there also exist employee discrimination and 
customer discrimination. The former arises within the supply side of the market, where male 
workers with be paid a higher wage in order to compensate their distaste to working with 
female workers. The latter arises when customer’s preferences for men leads to segregated 
occupations and work places (Ehrenberg & Smith, 436 - 440).  
Employer, employee, and customer discrimination models are the most common models 
that Becker put forward to represent of possible sources of labor market discrimination. Cain 
illuminates how Becker was able to insert “the abstract concept of ‘prejudice’ into the 
economic concept of ‘tastes’ […]” (710). We must consider the advantages and 
disadvantages to using the concept of tastes. Some of the advantages of Becker’s tastes for 
discrimination models include the continuity and measurability of “monetary units [which] 
have an intuitive meaning to experts and laypersons alike,” while also having behavioural 
and policy implications more generally (710). On the other hand, there are also 
disadvantages, such as the fact that “no attention is paid to any pain or stigma felt by the 
victim” (710). This is an important factor to note as it captures the negative aspect of 
women’s wages such as their marginal revenue productivity being discredited as I explained 
earlier in this section.    
The next source for labor market discrimination can arise out of statistical prejudging or 
statistical discrimination. This type of discrimination occurs when a “firm will evaluate the 
personal characteristics of it applicants, but in seeking to guess their potential productivity it 
may also utilize information on the average characteristics of groups to which they belong” 
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(Ehrenberg & Smith, 440). This is an important type of discrimination to consider as it often 
takes place before the hiring process even occurs and can create a stigma towards women or 
minority groups altogether. Additionally, there are also non-competitive market labour 
discriminations that can occur, including monopoly, monopsony, crowding and dual labour 
market scenarios and market environments. However, I will not go into detail of these types 
of discriminatory behaviours, as they are not relevant to our discussion here.   
Overall, we can gain a general understanding of labor market discrimination resulting in 
a gender wage gap from Gary Becker’s model, which results in a measure for discrimination 
as a proportion of the wage gap. This model allowed us to isolate men and women’s wages, 
first adjusted for individual characteristics and second unadjusted, and find the difference in 
wages for each gender category. What is important is that this model can tell us if there is a 
wage gap with respect to gender and further, what portion of the gap is the result of wage 
discrimination. Next, I will focus in on sources of discrimination. The most commonly used 
measure for sources of discrimination is employer discrimination. Here employers are 
sacrificing profits in order to satisfy their tastes for discrimination resulting in maximizing 
their utility instead of profits. This is important as it defies the basic neoclassical assumption 
that employers will maximize profits above all else, because the employer discrimination 
model reveals that employers are maximizing their utility and sacrificing profits to do so. 
Although this model suggests that discriminatory employers don’t behave in the way they are 
assumed to behave (profit-maximizing), it is still within the theoretical tradition of 
neoclassical economics. This finding supports the theory of discrimination and allows us to 
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claim that employers are acting in discriminatory ways because it’s possible to measure the 
sacrificing of profits for utility instead in the hiring practices. With this, Gary Becker offered 
an early, generalized account of how to measure the gender wage gap with respect to 
discrimination, while maintaining the neoclassical theoretical tradition.  
Next, I will look at another neoclassical model that is a further generalization of 
Becker’s. The reason for presenting two neoclassical models is that Karamessini & 
Ioakimoglou (who present a Marxist model of the gender wage gap) directly compare and 
criticize the Oaxaca neoclassical model to their Marxist model. I will consider the results of 
this comparison later in this chapter. First I look to the next model, Ronal Oaxaca’s, which 
was developed after Becker’s and offers a more generalized measurement of the gender wage 
gap. 
2.2.2 Ronald Oaxaca Model 
The next model I will discuss is the Oaxaca (1973) model of discrimination. This model is a 
further generalization and application of Gary Becker’s basic model previously discussed. To 
start, this model first defines the discrimination coefficient, D.6  
(1)  𝐷 =  �𝑊𝑚 𝑊𝑓� � −  �𝑤𝑚 𝑤𝑓� �°
�𝑊𝑚 𝑊𝑓�
�°  
where,  
�𝑊𝑚 𝑊𝑓� � = the observed male/female wage ratio; 
                                                          
6 The Ronald Oaxaca (1973) model (equations 1 – 16) can be found on page 694 – 697. D, in this model is the 
same as the discrimination equation found in Gary Becker’s model.  
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and  
�𝑊𝑚 𝑊𝑓� � ° = the male/female wage ratio in the absence of discrimination. 
This first step isolates for discrimination by subtracting the male/female wage ratio absent 
from discrimination, from the observed male/female wage ratio, and then dividing the given 
total by the male/female wage ratio in the absence of discrimination. Oaxaca specifies the 
natural logarithm as an equivalent equation. Oaxaca’s description of discrimination (1) is 
simply “Becker’s generalized measure divided by the wage ratio in the absence of 
discrimination” (695). The use of this generalized measure allows for increased flexibility 
and maneuverability in empirical work, according to Oaxaca:   
With natural logarithms:  
(2)   ln(𝐷 + 1) = ln
⎝
⎜
⎛𝑊𝑚
𝑊𝑓�
⎠
⎟
⎞
− ln
⎝
⎜
⎛𝑊𝑚
𝑊𝑓�
⎠
⎟
⎞ ° 
Assuming that employers in a non-discrimination labor market adhere to the 
principle of cost minimization, we have  
⎝
⎜
⎛𝑊𝑚
𝑊𝑓�
⎠
⎟
⎞ ° =  𝑀𝑀𝑚 𝑀𝑀𝑓�  ; 
where MPm and MPf are the marginal products of males and females, respectively. 
 
Now looking specifically at the estimation of D, as Oaxaca specifies, “Since 
⎝
⎜
⎛𝑊𝑚
𝑊𝑓�
⎠
⎟
⎞ °  is 
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unknown, the estimation of D is equivalent to estimating
⎝
⎜
⎛𝑊𝑚
𝑊𝑓�
⎠
⎟
⎞ °” (695). Furthermore, 
considering this estimation of D, Oaxaca specifies important assumptions that are included as 
while continuing to build the model further:  
If there were no discrimination, 1) the wage structure currently faced by females 
would also apply to males; or 2) the wage structure currently faced by males would 
also apply to females. Assumption one (two) says that females (males) would on 
average receive in the absence of discrimination the same wages as they presently 
receive, but that discrimination takes the form of males (females) receiving more 
(less) than a nondiscriminating labor market would award them.  
 
Given the assumptions, the effects of discrimination on the male or female wages are 
recognizable as opposed to a wage absent of discrimination. First I will define the wage 
equation for each sex group 
(3)   ln(𝑊𝑖) =  𝑍𝑖′𝛽 +  𝑢𝑖    i =  1, …. n  
where, 
𝑊𝑖 = the hourly wage rate of the i-th worker 
𝑍𝑖
′  = a vector of individual characteristics  
𝛽 = a vector of coefficients  
𝑢𝑖 = a disturbance term  
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As Oaxaca explains, the next step is to express the wage equation in a natural logarithm 
together with equation (2) and the assumptions of wages in absence of discrimination to 
understand the effects of discrimination.7  
Let  
𝐺 =  𝑊𝑚����� −  𝑊𝑓����
𝑊𝑓����
 
then,  
(4)    ln(𝐺 + 1) = ln(𝑊𝑚�����) − ln(𝑊𝑓����) 
where, 𝑊𝑚����� and 𝑊𝑓���� are the average hourly wages for males and females, 
respectively. From the properties of ordinary least squares estimation, we have 
(5)    ln (𝑊𝑚�����) = 𝑍𝑚′ 𝛽𝑚�  and  
(6)    ln (𝑊𝑓����) = 𝑍𝑓′𝛽𝑓�    
where 
𝑍𝑚
′  and  𝑍𝑓′  = vectors of mean values of the regressors for males and females  
 𝛽𝑚�  and 𝛽𝑓� = corresponding vectors of estimated coefficients. 
 
Substituting (5) & (6) into (4) we obtain,  
 
(7)    ln(G + 1) = 𝑍𝑚′ 𝛽𝑚�  - 𝑍𝑓′𝛽𝑓� 
If we let,  
(8)     ∆𝑍′� =  𝑍𝑚′���� −  𝑍𝑓′��� 
(9)     ∆?̂? =  𝛽𝑓� −  𝛽𝑚�  
 
and substitute   𝛽𝑚� =  𝛽𝑓� −  ∆?̂? in (7), then the male-female wage differential can 
be written as 
                                                          
7 Descriptions of equations (4) – (16) are taken directly from Oaxaca page 696-7.  
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(10)    ln(G + 1) = ∆?̅?′ 𝛽𝑓� - ?̅?𝑚′ ∆?̂? 
On the basis of equation (2) and the assumptions that the current female wage 
structure would apply to both males and females in a non-discriminating labor 
market, it can be shown that  
(11)     ln�𝑊𝑚 𝑊𝑓� � ° = ∆?̅?′ 𝛽𝑓�  
(12)     ln (𝐷 + 1� ) = - ?̅?𝑚′ ∆?̂? 
Thus expressions (11) and (12) represent the decomposition of the wage differential 
into the estimated effects of differences in individual characteristics and the 
estimated effects of discrimination, respectively.  
An alternative decomposition of the wage differential is obtained by 
substituting  𝛽𝑓� =   ∆?̂? + 𝛽𝑚�  in (7): 
 
(13)     ln(G + 1) = ∆?̅?′ 𝛽𝑚�  - ?̅?𝑓′∆?̂? 
 
On the basis of equation (2) and the assumptions that the current male wage 
structure would apply to both males and females in a non-discriminating labor 
market, it can be shown that:  
(14)     ln�𝑊𝑚 𝑊𝑓�� � ° = ∆?̅?′ 𝛽𝑚�   
(15)     ln (𝐷 + 1� ) = - ?̅?𝑓′∆?̂? 
What is important about this estimator is, “the separate estimates obtained from using both 
the male and female regression weights establish a range of possible values” (697). Using the 
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regression weights and separating the male and female wage differentials allows for any 
number of values. Another important variable to consider, as specified by Oaxaca, is work 
experience (697):  
Since the data on actual number of years of work experience for a large sample of 
worker are generally unavailable, we define a proxy for actual work experience:  
(16)    𝛽𝑖 =  𝐴𝑖 −  𝐸𝑖 − 6 
where  
𝛽𝑖 =  potential experience,  
𝐴𝑖 = the age of the i-th individual,  
𝐸𝑖 = number of year of schooling completed by the i-th individual.  
Oaxaca clarifies on page 697,  
Potential experience is a reasonable proxy for actual experience in the case of males 
since males on average exhibit a strong attachment to the labor force. However, 
potential experience overstates the actual years of work experience of females to the 
extent that many female workers have left the labor force for some period in the past 
due to their household and childbearing activities. …. If the estimator of the 
coefficient on the linear experience term were biased downward for females, then 
−∆?̂? would be upward in this instance. Consequently, there would be bias toward 
finding discrimination.  
 
In order to remedy the problem with work experience for females, Oaxaca specifies 
controlling within the tests for number of children (C), where “The linear children variable 
reflects the cost of lost experience due to child care, including the costs from the depreciation 
of skills during the periods of absence from the labor force” (698). Oaxaca discusses in more 
detail the remaining control variables used in the empirical study, however I will not go into 
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further detail of them here. What is important to understand within the model is the choice of 
control variable. Oaxaca claims,  
A researcher’s choice of control variables implicitly reveals his or her attitude 
toward what constitutes discrimination in the labor market. If it were possible to 
control for virtually all sources of variation in wages, one could pretty well 
eliminate labor market discrimination as a significant factor in determining wage 
differentials by sex … The other extreme is to control for virtually nothing and 
thereby minimize the role of productivity differences […] This is tantamount to 
declaring at the outset that the two labor inputs are near perfect substitutes and 
therefore attributing virtually all of the observed wage differential to labor market 
discrimination […]. (699) 
 
Generally, this model explains that the observed or measured gender wage gap is a result 
of labor market discrimination. This is the same result Gary Becker arrived at in the previous 
model described. What is important is that the observed wage gap is attributed to the 
discrimination coefficient, which is the “the simple difference between the observed wage 
ratio and the wage ratio in absence of discrimination” (695). This is the measure that Becker 
offered in his model and is emphasized further here in Oaxaca’s model. Specifically, the 
gender wage gap is a result of labor market discrimination because the models can be 
manipulated enough with difference control variables to actually eliminate the wage gap, 
which suggests the other sources of discrimination outside of the labor market (employer, 
employee, or consumer) are less significant to the wage gap since it’s possible to make it 
disappear.  
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In consideration of the neoclassical fundamental assumptions I discussed in the first part 
of this section, I can look a little closer at the effects of the neoclassical models I’ve 
considered. Looking at two assumptions: discriminatory tastes will be reflected in the wages 
(assumption 3) and competition reduces the degree of discrimination in the market 
(assumption 7). First, both models (Becker and Oaxaca) showed discrimination or 
discriminatory tastes in the different wages between men and women, positively reflecting 
the first assumption. However, the second assumption proved was not positively reflected, as 
competition and the market failed to eliminate discriminatory behaviours. What this suggests 
is that there are still some questions left unanswered about labor market discrimination since 
the neoclassical models were not able to satisfy or bring truth to each assumption. Perhaps 
then there is a need for alternative explanations and models of the gender wage gap and labor 
market discrimination. I will consider this idea in the next chapter, but first I will take a look 
at the Marxist theoretical framework and a model used to measure the gender wage gap.    
2.3 Marxist Approach to Labor Market Discrimination  
An alternative to the neoclassical models of discrimination, are the Marxist models of 
discrimination. Here I will look at a single model that is a feminist and Marxist account of 
labor market discrimination, according to Karamessini & Ioakimoglou (2007). This model is 
Marxist, in that it reflects “Karl Marx’s theory of wages [which] explicitly considers as 
determinants of the value of the labor power both culture – such as social habits pertaining to 
reproduction – and the balance of power between labor and capital, depending on 
unemployment and institutions” (32), while also using a Marxist framework of capitalist 
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competition. This model also utilizes feminist theories of how patriarchy and capitalism have 
contributed to producing employment segregation by gender (34). This model is an 
alternative to the neoclassical models when investigating the gender wage gap.  
According to Karamessini & Ioakimoglou, there is a main division that occurs within 
the different economic approaches to theorizing and modeling wages:  
The main division, however, is between the macroeconomic approach of classical 
economists who maintained that wages are determined according to a certain standard 
of living either equal to the level of subsistence or socially determined and 
historically specific, and the microeconomic approach of the neoclassical economists 
who argue that wages are determined through individual transactions and the working 
of market forces according to the marginal revenue product of labor.  
 
The methodological approaches to the different models discussed here reflect this division. I 
have already discussed the microeconomic approach in the previous section, which looked at 
wage and occupational discrimination amongst individual workers. Here the Marxist model 
is more of a macroeconomic approach, which considered social determinants of the wage 
gap.  
Further reflection on the division between neoclassical economists and classical 
economists is also reflected in the assumptions that underlie the theories and models within 
the Marxist approach. Some of the assumptions that are important to the Karamessini & 
Ioakimoglou (2007) model I will be discussing include:8  
                                                          
8 The assumptions have been taken from Karamessini & Ioakimoglou (2007) article; however I have added the 
numbering of them and put them into a list. The assumptions are not in any particular order or ranking.   
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1. Wage-setting is a political, cultural, and economic process embedded in an 
institutional and societal context. Market forces alone cannot determine outcomes 
(32). 
2. Culture and history matter, as does the relative power of employers and workers 
(32).  
3. Gender relations […] have fundamental effects on wages, as they affect both the 
bargaining power differentials between different social groups and cultural norms 
and values concerning the relative worth of their labor power […] (32).  
4. Gender differences in productivity-related endowments, discrimination, and 
segregation are not the only determinants of the pay gap. Gender relations are 
integral to the wage-setting process and institutions (34).  
5. Three dimensions of the wage structure are likely to influence the gender pay gap: 
the size and ranking of wage differentials by industry, occupation, and type of 
organization, the system of job grading, and the form of payment systems […] 
general changes in the wage structure may also affect the gender pay gap over 
time along with “gender-specific” factors […] (34). 
6. Individual bargaining takes as reference the average wage for the worker’s 
occupation in the industry, the worker’s firm, and the average qualifications and 
skills required for the worker to perform that occupation in that particular industry 
(41-42). 
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There are some noteworthy differences between these assumptions and those discussed 
previously in the section on neoclassical theories and models.  
First, it was understood in the neoclassical approach that non-discriminatory firms 
should outcompete discriminatory ones, and thus the market forces would clear the market of 
employer discrimination. However, the Becker and Oaxaca models made it clear that this 
does not always occur. In contrast, the Marxist approach does not assume that market forces 
alone can determine outcomes of employer discrimination (Marxist assumption 1). Another 
important difference is that neoclassical models assumed that men and women were “equally 
productive” and “had equal tastes for work” (neoclassical assumption 1), thus gender 
difference reflected discrimination. Whereas, the Marxist approach takes as an assumption 
that gender differences with respect to “productivity-related endowments” (Marxist 
assumption 4) cannot reflect discrimination or differences in the wage gap alone, and rather 
that there can exist “‘gender-specific factors” (Karamessini & Ioakimoglou, 34). This will be 
important for the development of the models and understanding the composition of the labor 
market to which the models are measuring. The next section will focus in detail on one 
Marxist model. I selected this model because the authors were very explicit about their 
unique feminist and Marxist approach, while also offering critiques of neoclassical models, 
specifically the Oaxaca model.     
2.3.1 Karamessini & Ioakimoglou Model  
The main focus of my discussion of Marxist approaches to the gender wage gap will use the 
Karamessini & Ioakimoglou (2007) model. Differing from the previous neoclassical models 
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discussed, this model starts from a “classical framework of wage determination,” arguing that 
“average earnings are determined socially by the value of the labor power, in the Marxian 
sense” (32). Furthermore, this model uses a “comprehensive feminist approach to gender 
wage discrimination, which we define as both unequal pay for equal work (unequal 
remuneration in the same job) and unequal pay for work of equal value (low valuation of jobs 
that women do)” (34). Largely, the aims of this model are “to shed light in the macro- and 
micro-determinants of the gender pay gap and contribute to a better understanding of the 
practices and processes through which gender wage discrimination is (re)produced” (35). The 
authors also aim to develop an alternative to neoclassical models, such as Oaxaca’s, which 
test for the gender wage gap (36).  
This model combines Marxist and feminist methods of measuring the gender wage gap. 
It consists of two equations considering both macro- and microeconomic factors affecting 
wages. The first equation they consider measures occupational wages, while the second 
measure individual wages (35). Once occupational wages are measured, deviations such as 
different characteristics, jobs, firms, and bargaining power of workers are measured to 
determine the individual wages. Thus, individual wages are measured from occupational 
wages. According to Karamessini & Ioakimoglou the two equations for occupational and 
individual wages arise from three levels of analysis:  
1. Factors determining intra-industry and inter-industry wage differentials among 
workers with similar levels of skill and education. 
2. Factors determining the occupational wage structure within industries. 
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3. Factors determining deviations of individual wages from occupational wages within 
industries. (35) 
As I work through the Marxist model, I will show these equations being developed with 
respect to each of these levels of analysis. First, looking at industry wages among workers, 
then creating a measure for the occupational wage within the industry, and finally, creating 
an equation for the individual wages by measuring deviations from the occupational wages 
that individual wages reflect within the industry.   
Starting with the first equation, I look at average occupational wages by modeling inter-
industry wage differentials is as follows:9   
Assume that there are (j) occupations; (k) industries; (R) average rate of profit 
across industries; (Y) value added (volume); (K) capital (volume); (W) the average 
money wage; (N) number of employees; (pc) consumer price index; (p) price of 
value added; (pcap) price of fixed capital; (pY/pcapK) productivity of capital at current 
prices; (WN/pY) labor share in value added at current prices; (w) = (W/pc) average 
real wage; (π)=(Y/N) productivity of labor; (k)=(K/N) intensity of capital; (w/ π) real 
unit labor cost; (π/k) capital productivity at constant prices. Then the general 
definition of the profit rate is:  
(1)  𝑅 =  �1 −  𝑝𝑝
𝑝
𝑤
π
� �
𝑝
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
π
𝐾
� 
R = (1 – labor share at current prices) * (capital productivity at current prices) 
To equalize the profit rate (Rk) in industry (k) with the average profit rate and 
given that the average nominal wage (𝑤𝑘𝑜) is set in the labor market, average 
industry prices are set at level (pk). These (pk) are prices of production in the 
Marxian sense and 
                                                          
9 The following equations are taken from Karamessini & Ioakimoglou pages 36 – 39.  
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(2) 𝑝𝑘 =  𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑅π𝑘
𝐾𝑘
+  𝑝𝑝 𝑤𝑘0π𝑘  
Once prices of production are formed, the average real wage in industry (k) has an 
upper bound given by the relation   
 
(3)  𝑤𝑘𝑚𝑝𝑚 =  𝑝𝑘𝑝𝑐 π𝑘 −  𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑐  𝑅𝑘𝑘 
[…] the average real wage (w*k) in industry (k) cannot exceed an upper bound given 
by the relation  
 
(4)  𝑤𝑘∗ =  𝑝𝑘∗𝑝𝑐∗ π𝑘 −  𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐∗𝑝𝑐∗ 𝑅∗𝑘𝑘 =  π𝑘  �𝑝𝑘∗𝑝𝑐∗ −  𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐∗𝑝𝑐∗ 𝑅∗ 𝑘𝑘π𝑘∗� 
Symbol (*) indicates that industry profit rates are not equal to the general profit rate. 
Thus (R*) is the general rate of profit when priced deviate from production prices. 
[…] the upper bound for real industry wages (w*k) is industry specific and the 
factors affecting industry differences in upper bounds are demand relative to 
productive capacity, advance in technology and work organization, and the degree 
of competition. […] 
The maximum real industry wage (w*k) is not what is actually paid (wk). The 
average wage actually paid in industry (k), is a function of the maximum real wage 
(w*k) and the bargaining power of working (λk)  
 
(5)  𝑤𝑘 =  λ𝑘𝑤𝑘∗ 
From this analysis of inter-industry wages, Karamessini & Ioakimoglou expect that the wage 
rates will be positively correlated with “persistent excess demand, productivity of labor 
productivity of capital, union density, and institutional factors” (39). These factors will 
consequently influence the bargaining ability of employees, as well as “average 
establishment size and degree of competition” (39). This is important as I continue to 
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develop the model because I already know that individual wages are the deviations of 
occupational wages, such as bargaining power. Therefore, the positive correlation found in 
the inter-industry wages will eventually impact the individual wages.  
The next step is to measure occupational mix and industry wages. Karamessini and 
Ioakimoglou note that differences in occupational wages are the result of differences in 
occupations requiring skilled (complicated) labor versus occupations requiring unskilled 
(simple) labor (35). Here, it is important to note that the skills gained through education and 
training for the skilled occupation are considered a commodity, resulting in complicated 
labor power as having “greater value than simple labor power and wage rates are higher in 
occupations of higher education and training” (40). What is important and valuable for our 
discussion on the gender wage gap, is that the “occupational mix affects labor and capital 
productivity and, eventually, the balance of power between capital and labor in each industry 
and, by this way, the average industry wages” (40). This results in the following equation: 
(6)  ln𝑊𝑘 = 𝑝𝐸𝑘 ���� +   𝜎 +   𝜀𝑘 
where (p) is a vector of coefficients, (𝐸𝑘 ����) is the vector of characteristics of industry 
(k) identified above including the composition of occupations in difference 
industries, and (𝜎) is a constant.  
Next, Karamessini & Ioakimoglou consider occupational wages in industry, where “Each 
industry has a different ability to pay for simple or complicated labor, according to its 
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maximum real wage (wk*). Thus wages for occupation (j) in different industries vary 
according to (wk*) (40-41). This can be expressed in the following equation: 
(7)  ln𝑊𝚥,𝑘����� = 𝛽∗𝐸𝚥,𝑘 �����+  𝑑 +   𝜀𝑗,𝑘 
[where] (𝑊𝚥,𝑘�����) is the average wage in occupation (j) in industry (k); (𝛽∗) is a vector 
of coefficients; (𝐸𝚥,𝑘 �����) is a vector including, first, characteristics of industry (k) ad 
defined previously and, second, average characteristics of occupations (j) in industry 
(k); while (d) is a constant capturing unobserved characteristics of industry (k). (41) 
The effect that women have within different occupations is important to note here, as their 
dominance in certain occupations and industries reduces both their wages and the wages of 
male workers in those occupations and industries. Consider the following:  
The share of female workers in an occupation/industry is thus expected to be 
negatively correlated with the average wage rate in that occupation and industry. 
This modifies equation 7 in the following way 
(8)  ln𝑊𝚥,𝑘����� = 𝛽∗𝐸𝚥,𝑘 �����+ 𝑦𝜙𝑗,𝑘 +   𝑑 +   𝜀𝑗,𝑘 
Next, I can consider individual wages with respect to the bargaining relationship 
between employees and employers. Karamessini & Ioakimoglou note, “While the individual 
bargaining power of employees differs according to their qualifications and experience, 
gender also plays a role” (42). Noteworthy of this Marxist feminist approach is the technique 
of including a unique vector for worker and firm characteristics which leads to the deviations 
of such characteristics from average wages rates (Wj,k) in occupation (j) in industry (k). This 
differs from the neoclassical approach which doesn’t actually measure for occupational 
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wages but rather inserts a dummy variable instead (42). With the difference in variables 
considered in this model, I can develop an equation for individual earnings: 
(9) ln𝑊𝑖,𝑗 − ln𝑊�𝑗 =  𝛽𝑗�𝛽𝑖,𝑗 −  𝛽�𝑗� +  𝑐𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗 
(Wi,j) is the gross hourly earnings of worker (i) in occupation (j), (𝑊�𝑗) is the average 
gross hourly earnings in occupation (j), (𝛽𝑖,𝑗) is a vector of characteristics (personal, 
job, and firm) of the individual (i, j), (𝛽𝑗) is a vector of coefficients measuring the 
market price for deviations of observed individual characteristics comparatively to 
average characteristics in occupation (j). (𝛽�𝑗) is a vector of average characteristics in 
occupation (j), constant (cj) is the unexplained part of (ln𝑊𝑖,𝑗 − ln𝑊�𝑗) and (𝜀𝑖,𝑗) is 
an error term (𝜀𝚤,𝚥���� = 0). Denoting with letter (m) and (f) the variables corresponding 
respectively to males and females, we take from equation 9 two separate equations 
for men and women working in occupation (j):  
(10) ln𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑚 − ln𝑊�𝑗 =  𝛽𝑗𝑚�𝛽𝑖,𝑗𝑚 −  𝛽�𝑗� +  𝑐𝑗𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗𝑚  
(11) ln𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑓 − ln𝑊�𝑗 =  𝛽𝑗𝑓�𝛽𝑖,𝑗𝑓 −  𝛽�𝑗� +  𝑐𝑗𝑓 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗𝑓  
 Since individual bargaining power of employees is expected to differ by 
gender, (𝛽𝑗𝑚) and (𝛽𝑗𝑓) should be different. Moreover, (𝑐𝑗𝑚) and (𝑐𝑗𝑓) should also 
differ, reflecting gender differences in unobserved characteristics and wage 
discrimination by gender. Concretely, it is expected that (𝑐𝑗𝑚) > 0 and (𝑐𝑗
𝑓) < 0.  
This is an important part of this model because we are now getting the first understanding of 
a measure that actually reveals a gender wage gap. Now the model adapts equations 10 and 
11 to consider workers distributed in more than one occupation. Thus, workers now have 
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average characteristics and averages wages, which is denoted further for men and women 
(43): 
(12) ln𝑊𝑚����� − ln𝑊𝑟𝑚����� =  𝛽𝑚 �𝛽𝑚���� −  𝛽𝑟𝑚����� +  𝑐𝑚  
(13) ln𝑊𝑓����� − ln𝑊𝑟𝑓����� =  𝛽𝑓  �𝛽𝑓���� −  𝛽𝑟𝑓����� +  𝑐𝑓 
where 𝑊𝑟𝑚����� and 𝑊𝑟
𝑓����� are the average reference wages for men and women 
respectively.  
Karamessini and Ioakimoglou claim on pages 43 - 44,  
Gender segregation of employment leads to lower reference wages (𝑊𝑟
𝑓�����) in two 
ways: First, a high female share of employment in an occupation lowers the average 
wage in that occupation (𝑊𝚥����).  
It follows from equation 12 and 13 that the difference in the earnings of the average 
male worker and the average female worker is: 
(14) ln𝑊𝑚����� − ln𝑊𝑓����� =  �ln𝑊𝑟𝑚����� − ln𝑊𝑟𝑓������ +  𝛽𝑚 �𝛽𝑚 −  𝛽𝑟𝑚������������������ −  𝛽𝑓 �𝛽𝑓���� −  𝛽𝑟𝑓����� + (𝑐𝑚 −  𝑐𝑓) 
The next part of this model considers the decomposition of the gender wage gap (44 - 47). 
The technique used is similar to that used in Oaxaca (1973), one of the neoclassical models I 
have already discussed in this chapter.  
(15) ln𝑊𝑚����� − ln𝑊𝑓����� =  �ln𝑊𝑟𝑚����� − ln𝑊𝑟𝑓������ +  𝛽𝑚 ��𝛽𝑚 −  𝛽𝑟𝑚������������������ −  �𝛽𝑓���� −  𝛽𝑟𝑓������ + �𝛽𝑚 −  𝛽𝑓� �𝛽𝑓���� −  𝛽𝑟𝑓����� +  (𝑐𝑚 −  𝑐𝑓) 
Term �ln𝑊𝑟𝑚����� − ln𝑊𝑟𝑓������ measures the impact of gender segregation of employment 
on wage differentials, since male and female aggregate reference wages depend on 
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differences in the distribution of men and women across occupations and industries 
as well as on the gender composition of occupations within industries. Term 
𝛽𝑚 ��𝛽𝑚 −  𝛽𝑟𝑚������������������ −  �𝛽𝑓���� −  𝛽𝑟𝑓������ refers to the impact of difference in observed 
individual characteristics on the gender pay gap compared to the impact of 
differences in average characteristics in occupations and industries on the gender 
pay gap.  The corresponding term in the standard Oaxaca-Blinder equation is 
𝛽𝑚(𝛽𝑚���� −  𝛽𝑓����), meaning that differences in individual characteristics directly affect 
the gender pay gap.  
The difference here between this Marxist model and the neoclassical model previously 
discussed is that the Marxist model is more able to separate “the part of the gender pay gap 
explained by the different occupational distributions of men and women from that explained 
by gender differences in the individual characteristics of workers” (45), which allows it to 
better estimate for the positive or negative contributions individual characteristics have on 
the gender wage gap. This is a very important part of my investigation in this thesis as I 
assess this complex phenomenon. The difference in techniques and tools that each model 
uses will be reflected in the empirical results once I actually assess the application of the 
decomposition models to real world data, which gives me insight to this phenomenon in 
reality. In the next chapter I will take a closer look at the important differences between the 
Marxist and the neoclassical models.    
 Next, I can assess the equation in this model, which is the decomposition of the gender 
pay gap: 
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(16) ln𝑊𝑚����� − ln𝑊𝑓���� = �ln∗  𝑊𝑟𝑚����� − ln∗  𝑊𝑟𝑓������ + ��ln  𝑊𝑟𝑚����� −  ln∗  𝑊𝑟𝑚�����) +
�ln  𝑊𝑟𝑓����� −  ln∗  𝑊𝑟𝑓������� +  𝛽𝑚 �� 𝛽𝑚���� −  𝛽𝑟𝑚����� − �𝛽𝑓���� −  𝛽𝑟𝑓������ + �𝛽𝑚 −  𝛽𝑓� �𝛽𝑓���� − 𝛽𝑟𝑓�����+ (𝑐𝑚 −  𝑐𝑓)    
This Marxist model considers “the outcome of difference in employment distribution of 
women and men across occupations and industries and the outcome of the gender 
composition of occupations and industries” (46). In this equation the first two terms on the 
right hand side measure the distribution effect, which is “women’s higher concentration in 
the lower-paid occupations and industries” and the undervaluation effect, which is “lower 
average wages in feminized occupations and industries,” while considering how each impacts 
the gender wage gap (46).  
 Overall, this model measures the gender wage gap through an alternative approach to the 
previously discussed neoclassical models. Specifically this model uses two separate 
equations, developed through a Marxist and feminist theoretical lens. The first equation 
refers to “average occupational wages in different industries” and the second refers to 
“individual wages as deviations from occupational wages in industries” (55 – 56). In the first 
equation it was possible to see that females within occupations and industries negatively 
affected occupational wages. The second equation clarifies the understanding that the 
“impact on wages of individual bargains between employers and employees according to 
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deviations of the characteristics of the employees, their jobs, and their employer from 
occupational and industry averages” (56).  
 Now that I have established an understanding and measure of the gender wage gap from 
both a Marxist and neoclassical framework, I can compare the empirical results. The next 
section will go into detail about the empirical results from each model separately, and then 
compare the results side by side to give us a better understanding of what the models are able 
to reveal about the gender wage gap and labor market discrimination.   
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this section I will now discuss some of the most important parts of the Marxist and the 
neoclassical models and assess some of the empirical results of the models.  
First, Karamessini & Ioakimoglou claim that their “proposed method of decomposition 
has a much higher explicative power of the gender pay gap than the standard one” (54). It is 
important for our discussion here to understand how the Marxist model could be, and to 
question whether it truly is, more explicative than the standard model. I start this inquiry by 
looking deeper into the results of both the Marxist and the neoclassical models. First, I assess 
the results of the Marxist model. Figure 1 shows the results of applying the Marxist method 
to the labor market in Greece in 1995.  
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Figure 1: Table 2 Decomposition of the Gender Pay Gap in Greece (1995), Karamessini & Ioakimoglou 
(2007: 53) 
Now breaking down Figure 1 to better understand what it is telling us, I look to the 
discussion offered in Karamessini & Ioakimoglou. The first component (1. in the graph) is 
measuring the segregation effect, which is the result of two different effects. First, the 
undervaluation effect where, “the higher female share of employment in particular 
occupations and industries lowers the average wage in these occupations and industries for 
both males and females” (52). Second is the distribution effect, where women are 
disproportionately represented in industries that have on average lower wage rates (52). The 
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second component (2. in the graph) is the gender differences in observed characteristics. 
Here age, education, job, and employer characteristics are taken into consideration. The third 
component (3. in the graph) is wage discrimination, which is the price employers pay for 
observed characteristics. The fourth component (4. in the graph) is the combination of 
“unobserved characteristics, measurement errors of observed characteristics, and wage 
discrimination by employers unrelated to observed characteristics” (54).  
A noteworthy point to understand about this decomposition of the wage gap is that, 
“[t]he third component of the gender pay gap represents the lower bound, while the sum of 
the third and fourth components corresponds to the upper bound of gender wage 
discrimination practiced in individual employers” (54).   Furthermore, given these 
measurements, Karamessini & Ioakimoglou claim:  
According to our theoretical approach, wage discrimination against women is not 
only practiced by individual employers but is also incorporated in the wage structure 
through the historical undervaluation of women’s work and current collective 
bargaining practice that determine average wages in occupations and industries. (54) 
This finding confirms where the gender wage gap is coming from, how it is built into the 
structure of employment for women generally, and what this means for understanding labor 
market discrimination.  
Next, I investigate the results of the Oaxaca model. It is important to note that the 
Oaxaca model does not look at the Greece 1995 labor market, but it is still worth taking a 
closer look at what the results show from the study. Note that a direct comparison of the 
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Marxist and neoclassical methods applied to the Greece 1995 labor market will be discussed 
below. Figure 2 shows the result of discrimination from full-scale wage regression using the 
Oaxaca method (discussed previously in this chapter).  
 
Figure 2: Table 3 The Effects of Discrimination Estimated from the Full-Scale Wage Regression, Oaxaca 
(1973: 705) 
 These results show the various control factors that were used to measure discrimination. 
Here, the idea is that once one controls for all these factors, the remaining differences in the 
wages are evidence from discrimination. Also, it is possible to isolate for the effects each of 
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these factors contributes to the wage. From these results it is important to note that “sex 
differences in the distribution by class of worker, industry, and occupation significantly 
narrow the wage differential even through industry and occupation are represented by highly 
aggregated categories” (707). Furthermore, Oaxaca claims:  
We are in agreement with other researchers that unequal pay for equal work does 
not account for very much of the male-female wage differential. Rather it is the 
concentration of women in lower paying jobs that produces such large differentials. 
Our results suggest that a substantial proportion of the male-female wage 
differential is attributed to the effects of discrimination. (708)   
It is noteworthy, that both the Marxist and the neoclassical method are finding discrimination 
to be a large contributor to the gender wage gap. However, both methods show different 
proportions of the gender wage gap are resulting from wage discrimination, undervaluation 
of women in occupations, and the distribution of women in occupations.  
To get a better sense of the comparison between both methods, I can look to Karamessini 
& Ioakimoglou once again. Figure 3 shows the breakdown that Karamessini & Ioakimoglou 
provide in their findings, note the Oaxaca-Blinder method is the standard, neoclassical 
method previously discussed, while Table 2 results refers to the Marxist, feminist method 
used by Karamessini & Ioakimoglou discussed earlier.  
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Figure 3: Comparative Results, Karamessini & Ioakimoglou (2007: 53) 
Karamessini & Ioakimoglou highlight some differences they found after testing their 
method and the Oaxaca-Blinder method to the labor market in Greece 1995:  
[…] we have found that the basic differences between the two methods lie in the 
respective contribution to the explained portion of the pay gap of gender differences 
in accumulated work experience on one hand, segregation of employment by gender 
on the other; in the size of “employer-induced” gender wage discrimination; and in 
the size of overall gender wage discrimination. (56)   
This is an important comparison as the two methods can be applied to test for the same 
categories but reveal a different percentage of the gender wage gap being attributed to labor 
market discrimination, i.e. the dominant source of the gender wage gap is different. Clearly 
occupational and industry segregation are the most dominant contributors to the gender wage 
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gap for the Marxist, feminist method, while discrimination is the most dominant contributor 
for the neoclassical method.  
A closer look at the comparisons in the empirical results of both the neoclassical and 
Marxist methods reveals that different components contribute in varying ways to the gender 
wage gap. Using these two methods together can offer a pluralist approach to measuring and 
understanding the gender wage gap. The kinds of pluralism in economics, and the way the 
case study aligns with them, will be topic of discussion in the next chapter, followed by a 
discussion about what conclusions I have reached regarding my motivating research 
question: What is the nature of pluralism in economics?  
  
 61 
 
Chapter 3 
Pluralism about Economics and the Gender Wage Gap 
3.1 Kinds of Pluralism about Economics 
I would now like to consider how the models I’ve just discussed in the previous chapter are 
relevant to the different kinds of pluralism about economics. Recall, I discussed different 
kinds of pluralism about science in Chapter 1. In this chapter I will discuss these different 
kinds of pluralism with respect to economics and investigate which kinds of pluralism the 
case study is consistent with and the consequences of this.  
3.1.1 Modest Pluralist Economics 
Modest pluralism about science accepts that multiple models or theories could be necessary 
to describe and understand a phenomenon given the context of inquiry at a particular time, 
but that eventually this plurality of theories will resolve into monism. Thinking back to the 
first-wave of pluralism in economics that was mentioned in Chapter 1, the attempt to increase 
competition and contestability amongst methods motivated pluralism generally, but the kind 
of pluralism which emerged aligns closely with modest pluralism. The goal for modest 
pluralism about economics remains that one method or approach will out-compete the others, 
and thus, that this pluralism resolves into monism.  
In the rest of this section I will discuss the ways that the gender wage gap case study is 
consistent with some aspects of this kind of pluralism. If I consider just the two neoclassical 
models together it seems like a case of modest pluralism, however once I consider the 
Marxist and neoclassical models together, it becomes clear this is not only a case of modest 
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pluralism but also another kind of pluralism. I argue that the best interpretation of this case is 
that it represents multiple kinds of pluralism. 
Starting with the two neoclassical models, the case is consistent with modest pluralism 
because the two models can be integrated. While both can be, and have been, considered as 
stand-alone models, they are based on the same fundamental assumptions and can be 
formally combined. These two models are modestly pluralist because they are 
mathematically consistent, both can be true at the same time, both use the same theory of 
labor market discrimination, both include features to measure wage discrimination by 
employers, and both are within a microeconomic paradigm.  
Looking closely at the consistencies between the two neoclassical models, I see some 
shared assumptions the two methods use. First, both models use the neoclassical assumptions 
2 and 3 about discrimination:  
2. Discrimination against females can be said to exist whenever the relative wage of 
males exceeds the relative wage that would have prevailed if males and females were 
paid according to the same criteria. (Oaxaca, 694)  
3. Discriminatory tastes will be reflected in the wage differences. (Arrow, 5) 
These assumptions can be further recognized by each model’s shared equation for the 
discrimination coefficient. Equation (12) from the Becker model and equation (1) from the 
Oaxaca model measure discrimination by subtracting the male/female wage ratio absent of 
discrimination, from the observed male/female wage ratio, then dividing the given total by 
the male/female wage ratio in absence of discrimination:  
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(1)  𝐷 =  �𝑊𝑚 𝑊𝑓� � −  �𝑤𝑚 𝑤𝑓� �°
�𝑊𝑚 𝑊𝑓�
�°  
This measure of the discrimination coefficient shows the mathematical consistency of the 
two models. This mathematical consistency can further be recognized by considering that the 
two models could be formally combined. I consider Oaxaca’s to be a more advanced model 
than Becker’s, because it starts with the discrimination coefficient and develops more 
complex equations that can control for and decompose particular variables such as 
experience, education, children etc. as seen with equation (16). Oaxaca’s decomposition is a 
way to empirically apply Becker’s model of discrimination. Within Oaxaca’s model, it is 
possible to see how different elements, specifically individual characteristics and 
discrimination, affect the wage gap, which can be seen in equations (11) and (12), 
respectively. Becker and Oaxaca’s neoclassical models are consistent with modest pluralism 
because the existence of pluralism can ultimately be resolved.  It can be resolved because 
these models can be formally combined and one can consider Oaxaca’s model as an 
extension of Becker’s.  
However, a different and additional form of pluralism, a form that is inconsistent with 
modest pluralism, arises when one considers the Marxist and the neoclassical models 
together. The reason for this is that the Marxist model and the neoclassical model both use 
their own fundamental assumptions and theoretical approaches to measure the gender wage 
gap, which are distinctly separate. Further differences between these models include the 
Marxist model being a macroeconomic approach and the neoclassical model being a 
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microeconomic approach to modeling and understanding the gender wage gap. Since the 
fundamental theoretical differences and technical differences between the two models make 
it difficult to formally combine them, this case cannot be understood as an example of 
modest pluralism. I will now look at the ways these two models are different in closer detail.  
First let’s consider some of the different fundamental assumptions. One of the biggest 
differences is the effect that market forces have on wages, specifically neoclassical 
assumption (6):  
6. Wages will adjust to clear the market. (Arrow, 5) 
and the Marxist assumption (1): 
1. Wage-setting is a political, cultural, and economic process embedded in an 
institutional and societal context. Market forces alone cannot determine 
outcomes (Karamessini & Ioakimoglou, 32).  
The neoclassical assumption here implies that wages adjust, according to the supply and 
demand for labor, until the market equilibrium is reached. Thus, the resulting wage is result 
of market forces. Whereas, the Marxist assumption is that there is a lot more than market 
forces that determine where the wage is set, including the institutional and societal contexts. 
The neoclassical approach seems to be separating the market from the institutional and 
societal contexts, which the Marxist approach includes. Specifically, neoclassical models 
assume the market itself can make wages adjust enough to satisfy the supply and demand of 
labor, whereas the Marxist model assumes more than the market itself makes wages adjust 
enough to satisfy the supply and demand of labor. This illuminates how these models are 
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from different theoretical traditions, which is enough to consider this case to be inconsistent 
with modest pluralism.  
A second difference is that these two kinds of models engage in analysis at different 
levels of organization. Neoclassical models and equations arise first, from collecting 
statistical information of both men and women’s characteristics that are theoretically relevant 
to determining earnings (education, skills, etc.). Next, from measuring wages for each gender 
group with respect to individual characteristics and measuring what wage would be without 
considering individual characteristics, and finally, from comparing the wages adjusted for 
individual characteristics to those unadjusted. The Marxist approach, on the other hand, has 
equations that arise from three different levels of analysis. First, measuring wages for 
workers with similar skills and education in an industry, next measuring occupational wage 
structure within an industry, and third, measuring differences in individual wages from 
occupations within an industry.  The differences in the approaches the two models use also 
contributes this case being inconsistent with modest pluralism, because the microeconomic 
neoclassical model derives individual wages from measuring different individuals in an 
occupation, whereas the macroeconomic Marxist model derives individual wages from 
measuring the general occupation wage and then measuring the deviations of individuals 
from this wage.  Again, the different theoretical traditions which each model uses, makes this 
case inconsistent with modest pluralism.  
A third difference in our consideration of the case of Marxist and neoclassical models 
together which makes it inconsistent with modest pluralism is the technical measure for 
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individual characteristics. In equation 15 of the Marxist model, the technical measure shows 
the indirect effect that individual characteristics have on wages: 
(15) ln𝑊𝑚����� − ln𝑊𝑓����� =  �ln𝑊𝑟𝑚����� − ln𝑊𝑟𝑓������ +  𝛽𝑚 ��𝛽𝑚 −  𝛽𝑟𝑚������������������ −  �𝛽𝑓���� −  𝛽𝑟𝑓������ + �𝛽𝑚 −  𝛽𝑓� �𝛽𝑓���� −  𝛽𝑟𝑓����� +  (𝑐𝑚 −  𝑐𝑓) 
In this equation the specific term of interest is 𝛽𝑚 ��𝛽𝑚 −  𝛽𝑟𝑚������������������ −  �𝛽𝑓���� −  𝛽𝑟𝑓������. This term in 
the Marxist model compares observed individual characteristics to average characteristics in 
occupations and industries, while measuring the impact on the gender gap.  This comparison 
between the observed and average characteristics allows this measure to show the indirect 
effect individual characteristics have on the wage gap. 
In the Oaxaca model on the other hand, the term is 𝛽𝑚(𝛽𝑚���� −  𝛽𝑓����), which measures the 
observed individual characteristics. Here, these characteristics have a direct effect on the 
wage gap. I also look at equation (8) and (9) in the Oaxaca model: 
(8)     ∆𝑍′� =  𝑍𝑚′���� −  𝑍𝑓′��� 
(9)     ∆?̂? =  𝛽𝑓� −  𝛽𝑚�  
 Where 𝑍𝑖′  = a vector of individual characteristics and 𝛽 = a vector of coefficients (i.e. 
control variables such as education, family, etc.). The Oaxaca technique results in ∆𝑍′�  
 and ∆?̂? being “near perfect substitutes,” which results in the personal, observed individual 
characteristics directly impacting the wage gap. These equations and this technique in the 
Oaxaca model allow for detailed examination of pay discrimination between genders for 
equal individual characteristics (Oaxaca, 699).  The technical difference is the direct versus 
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indirect effects of individual characteristics on the wage gap in the neoclassical versus the 
Marxist models, respectively. The technical differences and the equations used are the 
mathematical tools to express the theory of discrimination each model uses, further reflecting 
their different theoretical traditions and making this case inconsistent with modest pluralism.  
In this section I have considered the nature of modest pluralism in economics with 
respect to our case study. It is clear that two forms of pluralism exist; one is modest pluralism 
when I consider the case of the neoclassical models, then other is another type of pluralism 
that arises when I consider the case of both the neoclassical and the Marxist models. In the 
next two sections I will look into the radical and empirical kinds of pluralism to get a better 
sense of which type of pluralism can better explain the case of including the Marxist and 
neoclassical models of the wage gap.    
3.1.2 Radical Pluralist Economics 
Radical pluralism is one of the more extreme kinds of pluralism in scientific inquiry. 
According to this approach, the complexity of objects in the world demands there be multiple 
approaches to classify and understand the real world and I cannot argue that one is better than 
another. It is tempting to consider the pluralism arising from Marxist and neoclassical 
approaches as a case of radical pluralism. However, this kind of pluralism is vaguely defined 
within the philosophy of science literature and this makes it difficult to understand how well 
this case study exemplifies it.  
There are some benefits that would arise if our case could be interpreted as an example 
of radical pluralism. Allowing for the possibility that two different models could both be true 
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allows researchers to explore both models. Since these models consider different kinds of 
causes of the wage gap it could be the case that a variety of sources are considered true 
causes of the phenomenon. Each model reveals different aspects and source components of 
the phenomenon as contributing to the wage gap differently. One of the most significant 
differences between the two models is the Marxist model using a macro-economic theoretical 
approach, whereas the neoclassical model uses a microeconomic theoretical approach.  
However, there are also problems that arise from a radical pluralist approach.  
The difficulty with this kind of pluralism is its lack of insight into which models are 
better than others with respect to the phenomenon in the real world. If the intention is for 
economics to be socially relevant there needs to be a justification that the models are good 
representations of the phenomenon in the real world. Note that this is not a problem for 
modest pluralism because the models can be compared and combined. Furthermore, the 
empirical pluralism also does not have this problem because the reasons particular the 
models or approaches are chosen to measure a phenomenon is the result of assessing the 
phenomenon in the real world. In the next section I will look closely at empirical pluralism 
where I can better understand the benefits of using both models.     
3.1.3  Empirically Based Pluralist Economics 
The next kind of pluralism to discuss is empirical pluralism, where using multiple models 
offers a plurality of representations of a given phenomenon, which best reflects the 
phenomenon in the real world. In Chapter 1 I introduced empirical pluralism in science 
generally, where I showed that it can be associated with: (a) complex phenomena– whether 
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associated with crossing levels of organization or multiple factors within the same level of 
organization; (b) the existence of a variety of explanatory interests; (c) the openness of 
constraints – whether from above or below (such as different levels of idealization or 
distorting the phenomenon from its real world representation); and (d) particular explanatory 
strategies vis-à-vis phenomena being limited (xiii –xv).10 Empirically based pluralism is 
constituted by the use of multiple approaches to understanding the phenomenon of interest 
(Kellert et al., xiii). It is important to note that empirical pluralism is different from modest 
pluralism because empirical pluralism acknowledges that complete integration or resolution 
of pluralism would not be possible without losing some content about the phenomenon. 
Recall in the section on modest pluralism, I could integrate the two neoclassical models and 
resolve the pluralism without actually losing any insight into the phenomenon from the 
neoclassical theoretical perspective. However, I will show in this section that if I were to 
only use the Marxist or the neoclassical approach, I would lose some content about the 
phenomenon, specifically content about the source components. Considering the case of the 
Marxist and the neoclassical models I show that there is theoretical and empirical 
justification for using both models.  This section will look at the evidence from our case 
study that is consistent with empirical pluralism, while also considering benefits of this 
approach.  
Before looking at the evidence from the case study, I would like to consider the second-
wave pluralism in economics, as introduced in Chapter 1, and see how it aligns with 
                                                          
10 I have listed the ways myself, whereas Kellert et al. discuss these way extensively throughout the specified 
pages.  
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empirical pluralism. This economic pluralism was motivated by scholars within the discipline 
who were disenchanted with the “notion of science as empire building or paradigmatic one-
upmanship, a monist view they ascribed to many mainstream economists as well as to their 
first-wave critics” (Garnett et al. 2010, 2). Garnett et al. (2010) highlights some of the 
demands that scholars and students alike advocated for within this type of pluralism:  
[…] a more open and scientific economics, guided by a philosophically principled 
pluralism: ‘[a pluralism] that regards the various “schools” of economic reality, each 
bringing into view different subsets of economic phenomena … [and] rejects the 
idea that any school could possess final or total solutions, but accepts all as possible 
means for understanding real-life economic problems.’ (3) 
This kind of pluralism in economics requires different theoretical approaches for 
understanding and explaining a phenomenon and is explicit about the expectation that one 
approach alone is not sufficient for understanding economic phenomenon in the real world. 
Therefore the kind of pluralism the second-wave pluralism in economics is calling for is 
compatible and consistent with empirical pluralism. I keep this kind of pluralism in 
economics in mind as I now look at the case study to assess its consistencies with empirical 
pluralism.  
Looking at evidence from both the Marxist and the neoclassical models, I will assess the 
ways this case study is consistent with empirical pluralism. There are certain aspects of the 
case study, such as the complexity of the phenomenon and the limitations of each of the 
neoclassical and Marxist models that align with empirical pluralism. Recall in Chapter 2, the 
results of the decomposition from both models showed that occupation segregation and wage 
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discrimination were the most dominant source components for the gender wage gap; however 
the two models were opposite with respect to which component had the largest or most 
dominant contribution to the wage gap. The Marxist model found that occupational and 
industry segregation contributed to 56.5 percent of the wage gap, whereas the neoclassical 
model only found it contributed 15.6 percent. On the other hand, the neoclassical model 
found wage discrimination contributed to 44.7 percent of the wage gap, whereas the Marxist 
model only found it contributed 26.6 percent (Karamessini & Ioakimoglou, 53). Considering 
this result, it is possible to understand how using only one model in isolation could be lead to 
a partial understanding of the gender wage gap. If I were to only consider the Marxist model, 
my primary concern would be occupational and industry segregation, whereas if I only 
considered the neoclassical model, it would be discrimination that is most concerning. If I 
want to be as thorough and complete as possible in my knowledge of the gender wage gap, 
then it benefits from this kind of pluralism. Furthermore, both the Marxist and the 
neoclassical models come out of respectable traditions and by recognizing the strengths of 
both models I resist being dogmatic in my support of one model over the other.  
The wage gap is a complex phenomenon. It is different in different social contexts and 
likely has multiple causes. It turns out that these contexts tend to be explored and understood 
in different theoretical contexts and traditions in economics. The Marxist and the neoclassical 
models are both supported by strong theoretical traditions that rely on different sorts of 
assumptions. The Marxist view is well-suited to understand how wages are related to social 
standards of living and are socially determined in that wages are determined by the social 
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power of labor (such as habits of reproduction etc.) and the balance of power between labor 
and capital. The neoclassical view is better at understanding wages as determined by market 
forces, such as the marginal revenue product of labor, and individual transactions and 
exchanges. Insofar as there are these two kinds of determinants of wages, both theoretical 
paradigms are relevant, and in fact I will likely need more than one paradigm to understand 
the multiple facets of this phenomenon.  
I am now turning to a discussion of some of the differences between the two models in 
order to demonstrate how the different theoretical paradigms are relevant and how this case is 
consistent with empirical pluralism. Recall in Chapter 2, I highlighted some of the differing 
assumptions that were relevant to the models. First were the assumptions about market 
forces, where the neoclassical theory assumes market forces determine wages and the market 
can be cleared of discrimination through competition, on the other hand the Marxist theory 
assumes market forces alone can determine outcomes of discrimination. The differences in 
this assumption reflect the different methodological approaches of the models. The Marxist 
model considers variables that go beyond the market such as the social aspects that could 
impact labor and thus wages, whereas the neoclassical model focuses on what happens inside 
the market such as individual transactions and the marginal revenue product of labor. 
Another important difference was the assumptions about workers themselves.  In the 
neoclassical approach, men and women are assumed to be equally productive thus wage 
discrimination is directly related to gender differences. On the other hand, the Marxist 
approach assumed there are gender-specific factors that exist in workers, thus wage 
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discrimination is not directly related to gender differences. I look further at the models to see 
how this second difference in the theoretical assumptions surfaces in the technical equations 
used in the decomposition of the wage gap. Recall in the section on modest pluralism, I 
talked about the differences in the technique used by each model with respect to individual 
characteristics.11 Although this technique made our case study inconsistent with modest 
pluralism, it is this technique that makes our case study consistent with empirical pluralism. 
Specifically, in the Marxist model individual differences have an indirect effect on wage 
discrimination, whereas in the neoclassical model they have direct effect wage 
discrimination. The technique used in each model reflects the theoretical tradition it arises 
from and contributes to the difficulty in formally combining these models. The use of these 
techniques and the importance the techniques hold within their respective models make this 
case consistent with empirical pluralism, because losing either of these techniques could 
result in losing content or knowledge about the phenomenon. While these models are very 
different, it is possible to take a perspective on the gender wage gap in which we can see that 
both models refer to the same general phenomenon and that both of them contribute to our 
understanding of that phenomenon. 
Considering the definition of empirical pluralism and the desire of the second-wave 
pluralism movement in economics that various schools of thought to exist together within the 
mainstream of the discipline, it is clear that our case study is consistent with this kind of 
pluralism. In this case study I have shown two different theoretical traditions used to 
                                                          
11 Refer to page 61-62 and the discussion about the third difference between the models.  
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understand the gender wage gap, and this is consistent with empirical pluralism. Both the 
neoclassical and Marxist models are useful for understanding and measuring the gender wage 
gap; further, both are fruitful and insightful because they originate from fundamentally 
different assumptions and consider different variables to be critically important to the 
model’s success. Furthermore, this type of pluralism would not claim that the neoclassical or 
the Marxist models alone are the most ideal or possess the solution to the gender wage gap, 
but rather that both models together are a means to understanding the phenomenon.  
Referring back to the discussion in Chapter 2, both the Marxist and the neoclassical 
methods reveals different measureable components contributing different amounts to the 
gender wage gap. Although both models revealed the existence of the gender wage gap, the 
most dominant source of that gap was different. In the Marxist model the largest source 
component was occupational and industry segregation, while in the neoclassical model the 
largest source component was discrimination. The fruitfulness of this pluralistic approach is 
that it represents the diversity and complexity of the phenomenon. However, there seems to 
be a lack of real-world solutions to actually mitigate the wage gap. This suggests a need for 
future research and investigation. The value and fruitfulness of this kind of pluralism for 
economics is that it argues on theoretical and empirical grounds for multiple and diverse 
methodologies when investigating a complex phenomenon, which allows us to go gain 
knowledge from more than one perspective.  
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3.2 Discussion  
Considering the question that motivated my investigation into the gender wage gap: What is 
the nature of pluralism in economics? What seems to be the most pressing conclusion of my 
analysis of the wage gap case study is that some kinds of pluralism are exemplified when 
interpreted the way models explain and measure the gender wage gap. It is clear that the case 
study can be interpreted as exemplifying two types of pluralism: modest pluralism when I 
consider the neoclassical models alone and empirical pluralism when I consider both the 
Marxist and the neoclassical models together.  
Thinking back to the philosophy of science literature and kinds of pluralism about 
science discussed in Chapter 1 and using our discussion here in Chapter 3 about kinds of 
pluralism in economics, I have shown that more than one kind of pluralism exists with 
respect to the gender wage gap and that both kinds of models I’ve investigated are necessary 
and useful for understanding and measuring this phenomenon. Understanding what kind of 
pluralism is at play allows us to respect and value why and where the models are different, 
theoretically and methodologically. In the previous sections I highlighted some of the 
benefits of the kinds of pluralisms, including greater understanding and interpretation of the 
source components of the wage gap. Considering a phenomenon like the gender wage gap 
that is relevant, and socially and politically sensitive, it is very important that our inquiry into 
the phenomenon respect the complexity it holds in the real world. The modest pluralism 
stance shows us how pluralism is resolved within the neoclassical tradition and the 
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empirically based pluralist stance provides us the tools to recognize pluralism when I use the 
neoclassical and the Marxist models together to understand the wage gap.  
I will now explore additional benefits that arise from empirical pluralism by referring 
back to the discussion of theories and models in Chapter 1. Recall the criteria established by 
Kincaid (2012) for economic theories and models, where models have explanatory power if 
they satisfy the five following criteria: 1) provide insight, 2) unify (different phenomena), 3) 
serve as an instrument, 4) are isomorphic to phenomena, and 5) fit the phenomena itself into 
a model (Kincaid, 2012: 147). It would be extremely difficult for one model to meet these 
criteria. However, when I consider a pluralist approach, using more than one model, it 
becomes less difficult to meet these criteria. Together the Marxist and neoclassical models 
increase our insight into the causal source components, they unify by showing the same 
causal components of the phenomenon, they serve as an instrument by allowing us to 
describe the real causes of the phenomenon, the models increase our understanding of the 
causes that exist in the real-world, and I am able to express this phenomenon, as it’s 
understood in the real world, through the models.  
For economists, this investigation and understanding the nature of pluralism and its 
consequences are useful. In this case study I’ve addressed some of the many benefits of the 
different kinds of pluralism, however what is important to note is that there are in fact many 
kinds of pluralism that are exemplified within economics. Being aware of the kind of 
pluralism represented in particular instances helps us to direct and make sense of our 
economic investigations. In my case study the modest pluralism was actually resolved when I 
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considered only the neoclassical models. However, there was no resolution of pluralism 
when I considered the case with both the Marxist and the neoclassical models. In the latter 
scenario, there was both intuitive and concrete evidence from the case study that empirical 
pluralism was useful in terms of increasing our understanding of the case study. Pluralism 
here is better than non-pluralism because it allows us to appreciate the significance of a wide 
range of factors, such as the many source components to the wage gap, as well as the effects 
of market forces, competition, and individual characteristics of workers.  
For philosophers this investigation and understanding of the nature of pluralism and its 
consequences is useful because it offers a case study of multiple kinds of pluralism. The 
wage gap case study is consistent with different kinds of pluralism and there are benefits to 
both kinds of pluralism. This investigation furthers our understanding of scientific pluralism 
and the kinds of pluralism Kellert et al. present and identify. Furthermore, I think this case 
study suggests that it is unreasonable to think that models are independent of their 
fundamental and theoretical assumptions about the phenomenon. For example, the 
neoclassical model gives results based on the neoclassical fundamental assumptions 2 and 3, 
while the Marxist model gives results based on the Marxist fundamental assumptions 4 and 
5, as discussed and presented in Chapter 2. With such a complex phenomenon, I don’t want 
to limit my investigation by only considering an approach from one theoretical paradigm. 
Considering this case study from a policy or socially relevant perspective, the models tell us 
some truth about the phenomenon individually, but not all the truth. What I know is that each 
model is partial in that it focuses on different kinds of causes at different levels of 
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organization. I also know that the results of the different models are not consistent. Thus, I 
need to refrain from being dogmatic about the models in our approach to understanding this 
complex phenomenon.  
 In summary, right now within each theoretical tradition there is no justification for 
rejecting either the neoclassical or the Marxist view of the wage gap because they are both 
consistent with and arise out of a robust theoretical perspective and they both have empirical 
strength. If I look at this case study from a more global perspective, there is strong reason 
and justification to respect both views together, as made clear through my interpretation of 
the empirically based pluralism. With such a complicated phenomenon it is critical to look at 
different perspectives, as I have offered here. However, my interpretation of the kinds of 
pluralism being exemplified in this case does not exclude the potential of an all-
encompassing view of the gender wage gap to be developed in the future. As a result of the 
differences I identified between the neoclassical and the Marxist approaches empirically, we 
need more research to be done regarding further measurements and sources of this 
phenomenon and we cannot be dogmatic about either the neoclassical or the Marxist view 
alone.  
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Conclusion 
In the chapters in this paper, I have investigated the question: What is the nature of pluralism 
in economics? To answer this question I have focused on a case study of a particular 
economic phenomenon, the gender wage gap. This case study was chosen because it is 
socially and politically relevant, while being a complex issue in the real world. The existence 
of this phenomenon in the real world has important impacts on the welfare of individual 
people thus, it is important that I understand this phenomenon in the most complete way 
possible. In this investigation, I have looked closely at both Marxist and neoclassical theories 
of labor market discrimination and models of measuring the gender wage gap. Through my 
analysis of the two economic approaches, it is clear that pluralism does exist with respect to 
this case study and the arising pluralism is both economically and philosophically significant. 
There are however some very important things to note about the kinds of pluralism I have 
found. 
My most important finding is that more than one kind of pluralism exists with respect 
to this phenomenon. Both modest and empirical pluralism arose with different considerations 
of the case study. Modest pluralism was exemplified when I considered the case using only 
the neoclassical models. With this finding I make my first conclusion: in the case of the 
gender wage gap modest pluralism exists within particular theoretical traditions, and this type 
of pluralism acknowledges the importance of having multiple models or alternatives when 
considering any given phenomenon within that theoretical tradition.  Empirical pluralism 
resulted when I considered the case study with both the Marxist and the neoclassical models, 
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leading me to my second conclusion: in the case of the gender wage gap empirical pluralism 
exists within multiple theoretical traditions and is fruitful because it provides more complete 
knowledge of such a complex phenomenon.  This case study found multiple kinds of 
pluralism about economics being exemplified and being fruitful to understanding of the 
gender wage gap.  
But what does this say about economics generally? My interpretation of the two kinds 
of pluralism exemplified in this case study means that pluralism is a possibility in economics 
generally construed. The wage gap is a socially significant phenomenon, which will be 
different in a variety of contexts. This leads me to suggest that future research can look for 
modest pluralism within a theoretical perspective and be open to the possibility of empirical 
pluralism among multiple theoretical perspectives. This case study provides a strong 
foundation for further investigation into the nature of pluralism in economics, while clearly 
providing reasons to believe that allowing for the possibility that two different models could 
both be true, allows researchers to explore more than one model and further improving our 
understanding of socially relevant, complex phenomena.  
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